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NONPECUNIARY CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS
GEOFFREY P. MILLER* AND LORI S. SINGER**
I
INTRODUCTION
There has been an upsurge of interest in class action litigation over the past
few years.  Legal scholars,1 journalists,2 and politicians3 have all weighed in on
the topic.  Congress reformed federal securities class action procedures in
1995,4 and an advisory committee is weighing a proposal for fundamental
changes to Rule 23, the general federal class action provision.5  The Supreme
Court of the United States issued important decisions on class action settle-
ments during the past few years,6 and more are likely to follow.
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1. See sources infra notes 12-18.
2. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at D2 (plaintiffs in cor-
porate class action suits increasingly being paid with scrip while their attorneys walk away with mil-
lions in cash); Richard B. Schmitt, The Deal Makers: Some Firms Embrace the Widely Dreaded Class-
Action Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1996, at A1 (some corporations welcome class action lawsuits as
a means for preventing people from suing in the future); Richard B. Schmitt, Objecting to Class-Action
Pacts can be Lucrative for Attorneys, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, at B1 (law firms are earning large fees
from objecting to class action settlements); Mike Tolson, Attorney Fees: How Much is Too Much?,
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 21, 1996, at 13 (attorney proposes to take a $109 million fee out of $170 mil-
lion settlement); see also KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK (1995) (detailing how a bro-
kerage firm defrauded innocent investors of billions of dollars and landed in a massive class action law-
suit).
3. See, e.g., NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 147-54 (1994) (criticizing at-
torney control of litigation process in class action and other cases); Abuse of Attorneys Fees in Mass
Torts, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong.
(1997); Product Liability Reform and How the Legal Fee Structure Affects Consumer Compensation:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House
Committee on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1997).
4. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, Class Ac-
tions, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 559 (1996).
6. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., Ltd.
v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996).
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The class action procedure serves a number of objectives:  It conserves so-
cial resources by consolidating many similar cases in a single proceeding, en-
ables persons with small claims to obtain a hearing on their grievances that
would otherwise not be economically feasible, and facilitates compensation for
large numbers of injured persons.7  Class actions also serve deterrent purposes.
If a company can anticipate becoming a defendant in a class action lawsuit
when it violates the rights of large numbers of people, then it is less likely to
engage in wrongful behavior.8
Despite these benefits, critics of the process charge that class suits often
take the form of meritless nuisance litigation filed solely to obtain a settlement
offer,9 and that such suits are brought by plaintiffs attorneys whose primary mo-
tive is to settle the case for a high fee, even at the class’s expense.  Critics direct
some of their harshest criticism at so-called coupon settlements, which give
class members the right to purchase additional goods or services from the de-
fendant while plaintiffs’ attorneys receive multimillion dollar fees.10  The cou-
pon settlement is one species of a broader category of nonpecuniary class ac-
tion settlementssettlements in which consideration other than an immediate
cash payment is given to class members in exchange for a release of legal claims
against the defendant.
In this article, we provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of nonpecuni-
ary class action settlements.  Our goal is to replace some of the recent hysteria
about coupon and other nonpecuniary settlements with a more balanced ac-
count that identifies the benefits, as well as the costs, of such agreements.
First, we develop a typology of nonpecuniary settlements, and describe in
detail each of five types.  In addition to coupons, nonpecuniary settlements in-
clude distributions of securities, monitoring for future harm, reverter funds in
which unclaimed settlement funds return to the defendant, and fluid recovery
                                                          
7. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW & ECO-
NOMICS (Peter Newman ed., forthcoming 1998).
8. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict
of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 54-56 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Claudia MacLachlan, Meritless Class Suits: A New Focus, NAT’L. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at
A9.  On nuisance suits, see, for example, Lucian Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility
and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996); Robert Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litiga-
tion, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits
Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
10. See, e.g., Robert Mauk, Lawsuit Abuse: Public’s Welfare Hurt When Lawyers Help Themselves,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 28, 1997, at A5 (criticizing coupon settlements as unfair to class mem-
bers). Perhaps the best known coupon settlement is In re General Motors Corporation Pickup Truck
Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) and the companion case, General
Motors v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996).  In each case, the complaint alleged that side-saddle gas
tanks on GMC trucks were susceptible to explosion on impact.  Both nationally and in Texas, a settle-
ment was reached where class members would receive coupons toward the purchase of another GMC
truck within 15 months of receiving the coupons.
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funds where unclaimed settlement funds are distributed to persons other than
injured class members.11
Second, we analyze the pros and cons of nonpecuniary settlements from an
economic point of view.  We argue that while nonpecuniary settlements can be
inefficient, as critics charge, they also can be socially efficient remedies for
large-scale misconduct.  Nonpecuniary settlements can offer benefits to defen-
dants that can be shared with the plaintiff class, making all parties better off.
Moreover, nonpecuniary settlements can make efficient use of the inherent or-
ganization of the class rather than letting this resource go to waste, as would be
the case in an all-cash settlement.  The merits of nonpecuniary settlements
must, accordingly, be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Third, we analyze the considerations that are relevant to this particularized
evaluation.  We discuss several safeguards that may guard against undesirable
nonpecuniary settlements: repeat players, objectors, cash-out provisions, and
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  We propose a cash equivalency test
that courts can use in reviewing nonpecuniary settlements:  Is the settlement
under consideration as good or better, within a range of reasonable error, for
members of the class than what realistically could be expected in a cash settle-
ment?  We flesh out this test by suggesting detailed standards and factors that
courts may consider in particular settlement contexts.
Finally, in an appendix, we investigate the importance of nonpecuniary re-
lief within the overall mix of class action settlements, and we address the hy-
pothesis that the applicable rules on attorneys fees may influence the plaintiffs
attorney’s choice of forum.  We present a sample of 127 class action settlement
notices published in the New York Times from January 1994 to August 1997, as
well as the rules on awarding attorney fees in common fund cases in the federal
courts and the fifty state courts.
II
PRIOR LITERATURE
There is by now an enormous literature on class action lawsuits,12 including
a number of valuable papers on class action settlements.  Much of the settle-
                                                          
11. Traditional injunctive remedies also fall within the general class of nonpecuniary relief, but we
exclude these from our analysis because they raise different issues than the ones we address here.
12. On securities class actions, see Janet C. Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class
Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1996); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and
Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996); James
Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Ac-
tions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996); Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A De-
scriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491 (1996); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securi-
ties Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533 (1997).
On mass tort class actions, see, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice,
Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995); Jona-
than R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 909 (1995); Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of
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ment literature is normative,13 analytical,14 or descriptive,15 with a few papers
providing empirical data on aspects of the settlement process.16  However, there
                                                          
Opt-out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85 (1997); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement
of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837 (1995).
In general, see Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23, Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13 (1996); Samuel Estreicher, Foreword: Federal Class Actions After 30 Years, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 (1996); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Cases
Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219 (1997); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in
Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions,
N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1996); Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Ac-
tion Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615 (1997); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond the Class Action Rule:
An Inventory of Statutory Possibilities to Improve the Federal Class Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186
(1996); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Chal-
lenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (1996).  For a history of class actions since medieval times, see STEPHEN
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
13. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products,
Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (lambasting a class settlement for selling out the interests of
class members); Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and
Exit, 30 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 860 (1997) (calling for “thickening information and process”);
George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Ac-
tions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258 (1996) (stressing the importance of the right to opt out).
14. See, e.g., David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money, 39 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1996); Bruce
Hay, Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997).
15. For a particularly valuable description of the actual settlement process, see Schwarzer, supra
note 12.
16. Alexander studies the size of settlement in computer and computer-related securities (initial
public offering) class actions relative to the strength of the case against the defendant and finds that
settlements are fairly consistently 25% of the potential damages at trial; she hypothesizes that the
merits of securities class actions are relatively unimportant to the size of settlement.  See Janet C. Al-
exander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497 (1991).
Bohn and Choi examine 123 out of 3,519 initial public offerings that generated class action litiga-
tion in their sample. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evi-
dence on Securities Class Actions, 14 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 928 (1996). These authors find that the vast
majority of these lawsuits (96 out of 123) settled before trial.  See id. at 931.  Only four suits resulted in
a trial, with three verdicts for the defendant and one for the plaintiff.  See id.  The authors find a statis-
tically significant relation between offering size and incidence of suit; small offerings almost never
generate litigation.  See id. at 936.  They find that settlement amounts tend to track the size of potential
damages awards.  See id. at 976.  More controversially, they conclude from the data that most securi-
ties class actions claiming fraud by the defendant are in fact frivolous, although they do acknowledge
at least some evidence for the theory that class action litigation can be related to the merits and can
enhance enforcement of the securities laws.  See id. at 979-82.
Carleton, Weisbach, and Weiss examine a sample of 348 settled lawsuits, nearly all of them securi-
ties class actions.  See Carleton, supra note 12, at 491. They find the median value of settlements is
higher, and class periods shorter, for high technology industry cases than for other cases.  See id. at
510.  They find that only six percent of the settlements are for cases in which the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant disseminated misleading information about products under development (“vaporware”)
cases.  See id.  They find some evidence of smaller settlements/estimated damages ratios for cases in
which settlements were for less than $2 million, a result which they interpret as consistent with the
presence of nuisance suits settled on the basis of attorney expenses rather than economic damages.
See id.
Willging, Hooper and Niemic study class action lawsuits and settlements in four federal district
courts.  See FEDERAL JUD. CENTER, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996). They
find that across the four districts studied, a substantial majority of certified class actions result in set-
tlements—the percentage of certified class actions ending in settlement range from 62% to 100%,
while settlement rates for cases not certified range from 20% to 30%.  See id. at 60.  The report finds
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is a paucity of scholarship in general on nonpecuniary settlements and none
based on empirical work.  Our research has located only two articles devoted to
the topic.  A student note in the Harvard Law Review identifies and describes a
variety of coupon settlements and discusses the problem that the uncertain
valuation of such settlements creates for judges who must review a settlement’s
fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness. 17  The note does not address the eco-
nomics of coupon settlements, generalize from coupon settlements to nonpecu-
niary settlements, provide a standard (plus relevant factors) that a court might
use in reviewing a coupon settlement, or place the analysis within an empirical
context.  An article in the Journal of Law and Economics formally models the
difference between time-limited and dollar-limited coupon settlements, but
does not deal with other types of nonpecuniary settlements and does not ad-
dress the public policy arguments for and against these devices.18  Accordingly,
this paper presents the first comprehensive analysis of nonpecuniary class ac-
tion settlements in the literature.
III
TYPES OF NONPECUNIARY SETTLEMENTS
A nonpecuniary settlement is a settlement of a class action lawsuit in which
the defendant, in exchange for a release of legal claims, provides consideration
other than an immediate cash payment to defined members of the class.  We
exclude from consideration traditional injunctive remedies, which, although
nonpecuniary in nature, present considerations different from the ones ad-
dressed here.
For descriptive purposes, we divide nonpecuniary settlements into five
categories: coupon, monitoring, securities, reverter, and fluid recovery settle-
ments.  Most of the settlements are reached as a result of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) class actions or a state analog,19 although some arise under
                                                          
no particular relationship between timing of certification and settlement, contrary to what might have
been expected given the importance of certification in the process of class litigation.  See id. at 61-62.
A study by the National Economic Research Association examines characteristics of filing and set-
tlements in a sample of securities class actions.  See DENISE N. MARTIN, ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IV:
WHAT EXPLAINS FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS (N.E.R.A., Nov.
1996).
17. See Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810 (1996) (discussing the use
of and problems with in-kind class action settlements); see also Roberta Romano, The Shareholder
Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61 (1991) (observing that nonpecuniary
settlements present severe valuation problems).
18. See Severin Borenstein, Settling for Coupons:  Discount Contracts as Compensation and Pun-
ishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J. L. & Econ. 379 (1996).
19. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) states that a class action may be maintained if the
requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and if, in addition, “the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adju-
dication of the controversy.”  The matters pertinent to the findings include the following: “(A) the in-
terest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate ac-
tions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
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Rule 23(b)(1). 20  Generally, as part of the settlement, the defendant agrees to
pay all costs of notice and administration as well as the plaintiffs’ attorneys’
fees.  The defendant usually includes a cash component with the nonpecuniary
settlement to finance these costs and fees.21  Typically, the defendant denies all
wrongdoing, and the class releases the defendant from any and all liability in
connection with the allegations in the complaint.
A.  Coupon Settlements
A coupon settlement is a settlement where the defendant creates a right for
class members to obtain a discount on future purchases of the defendant’s
products or services.  The right to receive a discount is the consideration class
members receive instead of an immediate cash payment.  The defendant re-
ceives a release from legal claims and the benefit of the consumers’ increased
incentives to purchase one of its products or services.
A classic example of a coupon settlement is the Computer Monitor Cases,22
a nationwide class action on behalf of all persons in the United States who pur-
chased personal computers from a wide variety of manufacturers and retailers.
The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to disclose the actual viewable
image size in monitor screens at the time of sale.  Under the terms of the set-
tlement, if class members submit a properly completed form (attached as Ap-
pendix B) to the settlement administrator, they have the right to receive a
$13.00 rebate on qualifying purchases of monitors, computer systems, or other
computer hardware having a unit purchase price of $250 or more.  Class mem-
bers who do not take advantage of the $13.00 rebate offer have the right to re-
quest a $6.00 cash payment up to a maximum of five rebates.  However, re-
quests for the $6.00 in cash may submitted only after September 7, 2000 and for
six months thereafter.  Settlement class members who verify that they pur-
                                                          
claims in the particular forum; and (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.”  Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the rep-
resentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
20. Rule 23(b)(1) states that a class action may be maintained when the prerequisites of 23(a) are
satisfied, and where, in addition, “the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practi-
cal matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication or sub-
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
21. Though in certain circumstances, such as the defendant’s financial distress, the court might
award the attorneys a fee that comes directly from the settlement in kind, rather than a cash fee.  See,
e.g., Seidman v. American Mobile Systems, 965 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (granting class counsel a
fee of 25% of the recovery in the form of cash, stocks, and warrants, proportionally derived from the
settlement).
22. Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 3158, Cal. Super. Ct. (County of San Francisco),
Summary Notice of Pendency and Settlement of Class Action, Mar. 11, 1997,  published in N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1997.
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chased primarily for personal, family, or household purposes may transfer their
rebate form one time to any person, but the recipient may claim only the $13.00
rebate on new purchases, not the $6.00 cash payment.  As part of the settle-
ment, the settling companies agree to pay all costs of notice and administration
of the settlement, as well as attorneys’ fees of class counsel of $5.8 million.  The
defendants agree “to maintain and provide certain procedures and disclosures
nationwide regarding the advertisement of the actual viewable screen area for
personal computer monitors” for a period of three years. 23
The Computer Monitor Cases settlement includes an actual coupon.  In
other settlements, no coupon is distributed, but class members nevertheless are
entitled to some sort of favorable treatment on future purchases.  These set-
tlements are analogous to settlements involving actual coupons because the
class member obtains relief only by continuing to do business with the defen-
dant.  An example of this type of settlement is seen in Michels v. Phoenix
Home Life Mutual Insurance Co.,24 where the company allegedly committed
false or deceptive behavior in the sale of whole and universal life insurance
policies.  The class is entitled to receive relief from the defendant not through
purchasing new products or services, but by maintaining or reactivating an in-
surance policy.  The consideration given to the class member is not a right to
receive a discount in the future, but a right to receive a more valuable insurance
policy than she currently holds.  Under the terms of the settlement, class mem-
bers with policies in force are entitled to a variety of benefits provided they
keep their policies in effect.  These benefits include, depending on the nature of
the policy, a “dividend enhancement” (an increase in the dividends to which
the policyholder is entitled from the company), an “optional premium loan” (a
loan against the accrued value of the policy in force), an “enhanced value an-
nuity” (an annuity contract with increased payouts), or a “mutual fund en-
hancement” (an investment in a mutual fund with increased benefits).  Class
members with lapsed or surrendered policies are eligible to apply for an en-
hanced value policy and to obtain either an enhanced value annuity or a mutual
fund enhancement investment.
B.  Monitoring Settlements
Monitoring settlements are settlements where the defendant endows a fund
which is used to identify and compensate for future harm allegedly arising from
the defendant’s product or conduct. Most such settlements take the form of
medical monitoring in cases of exposure to toxic substances, as in the recent
Amchem case.25  However, monitoring settlements are possible in other con-
texts where a product may be defective and monitoring can identify whether
harm to the product has occurred from that defect.  In all monitoring settle-
                                                          
23. Id.
24. Index No. 5318-95, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (County of Albany), Notice of Settlement, May 1997, pub-
lished in N.Y. TIMES, May 1997.
25. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (rejecting settlement).
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ments, the consideration received by the class is ongoing testing for the harm
and, if the harm appears, treatment of the injury or damage.  The defendant re-
ceives a release from legal claims by members of the class and, if the fund is
limited, a cap on the money it must pay the class.26
A rather straightforward example of a medical monitoring settlement is
Woodward v. Nor-Am Chemical Co.27  Persons exposed to toxic agricultural
pesticides sued the manufacturer alleging that exposure to the substance can
cause bladder cancer and hemmorrhagic cystitis.  The parties reached a settle-
ment that included a limited fund for ongoing medical monitoring, reimburse-
ment for the cost of treatment of certain medical conditions, and payment of
compensation for injury or death.  In re Packard Bell Consumer Class Action
Litigation28 is a monitoring settlement outside the medical context, involving
claims of defects in certain Packard Bell products.  The manufacturer created a
six-month extended service contract for class members who submit a registra-
tion card to the claims administrator.  The extended service contract covers, on
a “carry-in” basis to authorized Packard Bell Service Centers, materials and la-
bor required for replacement or repair of defective hardware.29  If no harm oc-
curs, Packard Bell will pay a class member nothing, but if the defect causes
damage, Packard Bell is obligated to repair it.  Specific testing is not required
because consumers know when their computers break.
C.  Securities Settlements: Stocks, Puts, and Warrants30
A securities settlement is a settlement where the defendant distributes
stocks, puts, or warrants instead of cash to members of a class as consideration
for a release of claims for alleged wrongdoing. In a sense, the defendant is
raising new capital (in the form of a release of claims) from a group of purchas-
ers highly disposed to buy.31  The securities settlement resembles a traditional
corporate rights offering or prescription offering in that a limited, predefined
group is offered the opportunity to purchase the company’s securities.  The
class relinquishes a valuable economic claim in return for equity (stock) or an
entitlement to equity (options and warrants) in the company.
                                                          
26. If a company faces individual claims, it may have to pay high damages to each claimant
whether or not the person or product develops the harm.  If harm later develops, and the company has
been forced into bankruptcy by the earlier occurring lawsuits, people may get no compensation.  In a
monitoring settlement, if the company has a plan for allocating resources among class members and
can spread its payments out over time, it may be able to finance its obligations from future earnings.
27. Civ. No. 94-0780-CB-C, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7372 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
28. Case No. BC 125671, Cal. Super. Ct. (County of Los Angeles), Notice of Settlement, June 29,
1995, published in N.Y. TIMES, July 1995.
29. This settlement also has a coupon feature:  To activate the extended service contract, the class
member must pay a one-time $25 fee at the time of equipment failure.
30. For purposes of this article, we will assume the securities settlement involves an equity issue,
though there is no reason a securities settlement could not involve debt issuance.
31. The alternative to buying the securities is for a class member to opt out of the settlement and
incur the costs of individually pursuing a lawsuit against the company, or simply to not participate in
the recovery at all.
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An example of a stock settlement is In re TSO Financial Litigation.32  The
settlement provides a fund of the defendant’s common stock valued at $2.1
million plus a cash component of $750,000.  Class members receive stock in the
company in proportion to their losses.  The settlement agreement contains a
“share value guarantee” with respect to the stock fund, under which, in the
event the defendant’s stock does not trade at or above $12 per share during a
consecutive ten-day trading period over the four years ensuing from the date of
settlement, the defendant will pay the difference between the trading value and
$12 either in cash or additional stock to class members who still hold their secu-
rities.  At settlement time, the company’s stock was trading at $7.87 per share.
A put option settlement is a variant on the common stock settlement. The
put provides assurances that the stock of a company will not go down below the
put exercise price.  However, the put has value only if a class member still holds
stock in the company or the put is transferable.  In Derdiarian v. Futterman
Corp.,33 the defendant agreed to issue one put option for each share of its stock
purchased during the period of the alleged wrongdoing.  The options entitled
the holder to put one share of stock to the corporation for $6 during the last ten
days of either of the two years after its issuance.  The defendant retained the
right to call the options at any time prior to exercise for $1.25 each.  At the time
of settlement, the company’s stock was trading at $5.62 per share.  The option
holders had the right to sell their options to the company within sixty days of
issuance for seventy cents each.  The Derdiarian settlement allowed the holders
of the put options to profit if the company’s stock went down in the market,
since they had the right to receive $6 a share from the company on the exercise
date.  The company, however, could limit its liability by calling the options if it
believed it would have to pay more than $1.25 per option when the option
holders exercised their put.  If the company’s stock were to go up in the market,
the option holders would not profit from the options, but they would gain the
benefit of the price rise in their underlying shares.
Warrant settlements introduce a slight twist into the basic securities settle-
ment.  The holder of a warrant has the right to purchase stock at a stated price
in the future.  Because the strike price of the warrant is always set at a level
above the current market value of a company’s stock, it is not in a class mem-
ber’s interest to exercise the warrant until some future date at which the value
of the company’s stock exceeds the strike price.34  An example of a warrant set-
tlement is Seidman v. American Mobile Systems,35 a securities class action by
purchasers of a firm’s common stock who claimed that the defendants’ misrep-
                                                          
32. Civ. No. 87-7903, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7434 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
33. 254 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
34. Suppose, for example, that the company’s stock is trading at $5, and the strike price of the
warrant is $8.  If the stock goes up above $8, say to $10, the warrant holder can make a profit of $2 by
exercise.  On the other hand, if the stock goes up only to $6 during the period of the warrant, it will
never be in the interest of the warrant holder to exercise the right, since he or she would have to pay
$8 for stock with a market value of  $6.
35. 965 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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resentations had caused them to pay too high a price.  The settlement with the
defendant issuer provided for payment of $200,000 in cash, $225,000 in either
cash or common stock, and eighteen-month warrants to purchase shares of
common stock.  This settlement reduced the cash payout required by the de-
fendant while giving aggrieved class members the right to share in any increase
in value of the company, both by virtue of holding stock and by exercising war-
rants if and when the company’s stock rose in value above the strike price of
the warrants.
D.  Reverter Fund Settlements
Reverter funds are, in a sense, not properly classifiable as nonpecuniary set-
tlements since they involve a cash payment by the defendant.  However, re-
verter funds do not involve an immediate cash payment because the defendant
pays an escrow agent instead of directly paying class members.  Class members
must apply to the escrow agent or claims administrator to receive their money.
At the end of the payment period, if all class members have not submitted
claims for their share of the fund, the excess in the escrow account reverts to
the defendant.
The escrow account provides class members with security that they will re-
ceive their money so long as they qualify for an award and they follow the nec-
essary application procedures.  The consideration received by the class is the
right to receive the agreed-on payments, plus the security the escrow account
provides.  In exchange for establishing the escrow account, the defendant re-
ceives an immediate release of liability at the time of settlement.  Boeing v. Van
Gemert36 is a well-known reverter fund case.37  The district court established a
fund of $3,289,359, plus prejudgment interest, and ordered the defendant to pay
the fund into an escrow account at a bank.  Class members were known with
certainty, and each member had a present vested interest in the escrow fund
that could easily be valued.  If class members failed to claim the full amount of
the fund, it appeared that the remaining funds would return to the defendant.38
E.  Fluid Recovery Settlements
A fluid recovery, or cy pres, settlement is one in which some or all of the
settlement funds are distributed to persons or entities who have not established
their right to relief and/or have not suffered actual damage.39  Recipients of re-
lief may include nonclass members such as charities or funds to promote schol-
                                                          
36. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
37. Unusually, the case went to trial on the merits rather than settling.  However, the case is also
illustrative in the settlement context.
38. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had at least a “colorable” right to the un-
claimed funds.  See Boeing, 444 U.S. at 477.
39. On fluid recovery funds, see generally Kenneth Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975); Michael Malina, Fluid Class Recovery
as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477 (1972); Comment, Damage Distribu-
tion in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448 (1972).
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arship or public safety.  Typically, in fluid recovery cases, the class is large, each
member has a small claim, and a large fraction of the class either cannot be
identified or is unlikely to file a claim even if notified of the lawsuit.40
In Gordon Gredell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,41 the class consisted of all
consumers within the United States who purchased one of five Phenergan ex-
pectorant drug products between 1973 and 1984.  Wyeth Laboratories allegedly
omitted a disclosure statement that the drug products had not been proven to
provide relief of coughs due to colds.  In the notice to the class, Gredell was set
for trial and the plaintiffs’ attorneys requested that the court consider distrib-
uting any recovery in a manner other than directly to the class.42  Gredell pres-
ents an obvious case for fluid class recovery, since the costs of identifying peo-
ple who purchased cough medicine over a ten-year period would be prohibitive.
IV
THE ECONOMICS OF NONPECUNIARY SETTLEMENTS
A.  The Case Against Nonpecuniary Settlements
A common feature of all nonpecuniary settlements is that valuation is inevi-
tably problematic.  The value of a contemporaneous cash settlement paid to de-
fined beneficiaries is a straightforward determination:  One simply calculates
the payments owed and adds them up.  However, nonpecuniary settlements
have features that make them difficult to appraise.
The case against nonpecuniary settlements is based on the proposition that
plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense counsel can manipulate a nonpecuniary set-
tlement in order to give it an unrealistically high valuation.  Such behavior en-
hances the likelihood that the settlement will be approved in court and may in-
crease the attorneys’ fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel, but the actual benefits
to the class may suffer as a result.
In this subsection, we discuss these valuation problems, highlight the agency
problems inherent in the role of “entrepreneurial” attorneys in class action liti-
gation, and, finally, observe how self-interested attorneys can manipulate the
valuation of nonpecuniary settlements to benefit themselves at the expense of
the class.
                                                          
40. An example is all milk drinkers in the state of California who have been injured by unlawfully
fixed milk prices.  See Bruno v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
41. Case No. 87 CH 8445, Ill. Cir. Ct., Ch. Div. (Cook County), Notice of Settlement, July 7, 1994,
published in N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1994.
42. For an example of a fluid recovery in the settlement context, see In re Insurance Antitrust Liti-
gation, MDL No. 767, No. C 88-1688 (CAL), N.D. Cal., Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Pro-
posed Settlement and Hearing, Jan. 17, 1996, published in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1995 (proposed settlement
of  $21 million to go toward developing the Public Entity Risk Institute, which would provide training,
education, and technical services to public entities and other policyholders that share many of the same
insurance needs as public entities).
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1. Valuation Problems in Nonpecuniary Settlements.  In coupon settlements,
class members receive the right to a discount on the purchase of a product or
service.  If all class members intended to purchase the given product or service
already, and proceeded to do so using their coupons, valuation would be easy.
In the real world, however, many consumers do not want to purchase the item
in question.  For them, the right to receive a discount will be worthless, unless
they can transfer the coupon for value to someone who does want the item.
Even if transfer of coupons is permitted, the process is likely to be costly and
inefficient, and the original holders of the coupons will surely receive
lessoften drastically lessthan the amount of the discount upon sale.  The
amount they will receive if they sell cannot easily be determined at the time of
settlement.
Moreover, even if a class member exercises the coupon and purchases the
item or service in question, this fact in itself does not indicate that the con-
sumer has received the full value of the discount.  Assume that the consumer
does not particularly want to buy the item in questionsay, a bottle of sham-
poo.  Although the market price of the shampoo is five dollars, the consumer
would not be willing to pay more than three dollars for a bottle.  Now the con-
sumer receives a coupon as part of a class action settlement entitling her to
purchase a bottle of shampoo for two dollars, a discount of three dollars.  The
consumer will purchase the shampoo and use the coupon.  However, she has
not received a benefit of three dollars.  The benefit to her is only one dollar: the
difference between the amount she was willing to pay for the shampoo (three
dollars) and the amount she had to pay (two dollars).  Thus, even with respect
to persons who exercise their coupons, one cannot assume that the value of the
coupon is equal to the full value of the discount over market price.
In the case of monitoring settlements, the value of the relief depends on
how many class members avail themselves of the monitoring process and how
many eventually require the treatment (or service) for which the defendant will
pay.  It also depends on how much the treatment or service costs at the time of
need.  Monitoring settlements sometimes involve a limited fund, so the amount
the defendant must pay the class is capped.  If there is a cap on the settlement,
there will be a ceiling that constrains the value of the settlement on the high
end.  However, the defendant ultimately might pay out only a fraction of the
fund, so it is impossible ex ante to tell what the total cash value of the settle-
ment will be.
Securities settlement valuation problems primarily result from not knowing
ex ante how much a particular security will be worth to the class in the future.
With stock settlements, a share value guarantee may place a floor under the
stock’s value for a certain length of time, but otherwise it is unknown what
market valuation of the stock will be.  Puts also create a floor for class mem-
bers, but under stock they separately own.  The value of a put to a class mem-
ber and cost to the defendant depends on where the stock is trading during the
put time period, and could be worthless if the stock trades above the put value,
or worth at most a low amount if the defendant has a right to call the put at any
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time for that low amount, and does so. The value of warrants depends on
whether the company’s stock ever rises above the value during the warrant
time period, so that it is worthwhile for class members to exercise the warrant.
With stocks, puts, and warrants, the impossibility of ex ante market valuation
means that it is difficult to tell what the securities ultimately will be worth in
cash.
The potential total value of a reverter fund settlement to the class is known,
and protected by being placed in an escrow account, but the actual value to the
class and cost to the defendant depends on how many class members apply to
receive funds from the account.  Generally, an escrow account is used when
there is a long payout period and the class is not directly given its recovery, but
must apply for it (even if the identity of class members is known to the defen-
dant).  With a reverter fund, it is unclear how much money will be paid out.
Hence, under a reverter fund, the ultimate value of the fund to the class is un-
known until the time period for claiming funds has expired and the remainder
in the escrow account has been returned to the defendant.
The valuation of a fluid recovery fund can be exceedingly complicated be-
cause some or all payments in a fluid recovery go to persons other than class
members who have suffered harm.  If others get part of the fund, the value of
the settlement may not be the value to the class members only, since the defen-
dant is paying out additional sums.  Should sums received by others receive full
credit in the valuation process?  What about moneys that are paid for ostensi-
bly eleemosynary purposes, such as charities or public education campaigns?
Perhaps the value of the settlement should be considered to be the full amount
paid out by the defendant, for whatever purpose, but this valuation severs the
link between value and recovery to the class members.
In short, each of the five categories of nonpecuniary relief presents signifi-
cant, albeit distinctive, issues of valuation.
2. The Role of the Entrepreneurial Attorney.  Litigation leading to
nonpecuniary settlements, like all class action litigation, is subject to the
general problem of the plaintiffs’ attorney who functions as an “entrepreneur”
free of substantial monitoring by her ostensible “clients.”43  When class counsel
retains almost total control over a class’s case, including making the decision
about whether to accept a settlement, there is legitimate concern about a
potential conflict of interest between class counsel and the class.  The attorneys
                                                          
43. This is an important theme of John Coffee’s work.  See Coffee, supra note 12; John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Ac-
tions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1985); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working,
42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983).  Similar arguments are found in Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Rec-
ommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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find the cases, locate the named plaintiffs, and control all aspects of the
litigation, using the representative plaintiff as little more than the key to the
courthouse door.  Under these conditions, there is a danger that class counsel
may accept a settlement that is less favorable to the class than what counsel
might obtain by further prosecution of the case.  The defendant can make it
advantageous for counsel to accept such an offer by agreeing to pay generous
attorneys’ fees.  From the defendant’s point of view, it makes little difference
whether money is paid to class counsel or to the class.44  The defendant wants to
minimize the sum of attorneys fees’ and substantive class relief.  A purely self-
interested plaintiffs' attorney, on the other hand, wants to obtain as great a
profit as possible.45
Consider the following two settlements, either of which defendant would
sign: 
Recipient(s) Settlement 1 Settlement 2
Attorney
Class
Total
      $   100
      $   900
      $1,000
      $200
      $700
      $900
Settlement 1 is preferable for the class, because the class members receive
$200 more than in settlement 2.  However, settlement 2 is preferable both for
class counsel, who receives $200 in fees rather than $100 as in settlement 1, and
for the defendant, whose total costs are only $900 as compared with $1,000.  If
class counsel primarily is interested in the fee he earns today, class counsel
likely will arrange settlement 2 with the defendant, as opposed to continuing
litigation to reach settlement 1.
The concern about the potential conflict of interest between the class and
class counsel becomes more acute when parallel class actions are filed in multi-
ple jurisdictions.  Any of these “overlapping class actions”46 may result in a set-
tlement that cuts off the other class claims.47  The defendant, therefore, can play
plaintiffs’ attorneys in the different jurisdictions against one another in a
“reverse auction,” 48 looking to negotiate a settlement with the attorneys who
will accept the lowest amount of damages and attorneys’ fees combined.
                                                          
44. However, the defendant may want to minimize the award to class counsel in order to deter
future class litigation.
45. Obviously, the assumption that plaintiffs’ attorneys are purely self-interested in the short term
does not hold true in practice.  A plaintiff’s attorney may sacrifice some of her fee in order to gain
more in damages for the class, or may accept a lower fee today in order to attract more business so
that she will maximize her income over time.
46. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1996).
47. This problem has increased greatly with the Supreme Court’s holding in Matsushita Electrical
Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996), that state courts have jurisdiction to enter binding
judgments over claims in class action lawsuits that they would not have had authority to hear origi-
nally.
48. The leading treatment of this problem is in Coffee, supra note 12.
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3. Special Problems of Nonpecuniary Relief.  When nonpecuniary
settlements are being negotiated instead of cash awards, there is an added level
of complexity because the defendant and class counsel have an opportunity to
manipulate the valuation of the settlement in order to serve their individual
purposes.  The problem of sacrificing class recovery for the attorneys’ fee
becomes exacerbated.  Because the fee is typically in cash, the ratio of the fee
to the class recovery can be manipulated by exaggerating the value of the
nonpecuniary class settlement.  Thus the fee may seem a smaller percentage of
the class recovery than it is in fact.
Consider the following settlement, where the plaintiffs attorneys obtain the
maximum value possible from the defendant, but use uncertainties of valuation
to disguise the percentage of the settlement represented by their fee:
Recipient(s) Attorneys’
Appraisal
Actual Value
 (not observed)
Best Available
Settlement for Class
Attorney
Class
Total
$500 cash (33.3%)
$1,000  nonpec.
$1,500
$500 cash (41.6%)
$700  nonpec.
$1,200
$400  cash  (33.3%)
$800 cash
$1,200
Under the settlement as appraised by the attorneys, the attorneys receive
one third of the fund.  However, under the actual value of the settlement, the
attorneys receive 41.6% of the fund.  Thus, the attorneys have manipulated the
valuation of the settlement in order to make the fee seem smaller, as a percent-
age of the class relief, than it actually is.  Assuming the defendant will not pay
more than $1,200 in total, and the rule on fees in the applicable jurisdiction
provides that attorney’s receive one-third of the total recovery, with the court’s
rule would benefit the class which received $800 cash and the attorneys $400.
The class would be better off because it would receive a total compensation of
$800 as opposed to $700.
Nonpecuniary settlements also can be used to disguise the fact that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys have obtained a less-than-optimal settlement from the de-
fendant in exchange for a high fee.  Consider the following example:
Recipient(s) Attorneys’
Appraisal
Actual Value
(not observed)
Best Available
Settlement for
Class
Attorney
Class
Total
$500 cash (33.3%)
$1,000 nonpec.
$1,500
$500 cash (50%)
$500 nonpec.
$1,000
$400 cash (33.3%)
$800 cash
$1,200
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The difference between this case and the previous one is that the unob-
served actual value ($1,000) is less than what could be obtained from the de-
fendant if the case were litigated in the best interests of the class ($1,200).
Here, the defendant has agreed to give the plaintiffs’ attorneys a higher fee
($500 instead of $400) in return for a reduction in the total amount that the de-
fendant will have to pay to settle the case (from $1,200 to $1,000).  The class
loses in two ways:  The attorneys receive a larger share of the total recovery
than what they are entitled to under the rules of the jurisdiction, and the class
loses an additional amount ($200) to the defendant because class counsel has
traded off a lower total recovery against a higher fee.49
Plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense counsel have yet another reason to present
an exaggerated valuation of the recovery to the court:  The larger the apparent
recovery, the more likely it is that the court will approve the settlement.  If the
defendant offers a low amount in cash, the court might reject the settlement as
inadequate.  The plaintiffs’ attorneys have an incentive to support the defen-
dant’s valuation because they want the settlement approved in order to receive
their fee.
As a final complication, the plaintiffs’ attorneys may use the valuation po-
tential of the settlement to shop for high fees among the different jurisdictions
that can hear the case.  If the attorneys can find a court that awards a fee based
on the percentage of the recovery50 and that will accept a high valuation of the
settlement, it is possible this court will award an attorneys’ fee that is higher
than any other percentage jurisdiction or lodestar jurisdiction.51  Again, this fee
will come at expense of the class’s optimal recovery because the attorneys’ fee
should be predicated on the actual value of the fund the class receives.
B.  The Case for Nonpecuniary Settlements
In this subsection, we address the efficiencies and deterrence effects that
can make nonpecuniary settlements desirable over cash settlements, even if
there is potential for conflict between the entrepreneurial attorney and the
class.
The efficiencies of nonpecuniary settlements arise because of benefits such
settlements can offer either to the plaintiff, the defendant, or bothbenefits
that can be shared between the parties, making everyone better off.  For exam-
                                                          
49. See William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiff’s Bar: Awarding the Attorney’s Fee in Class
Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 191-94 (1994) (trade-off between recovery and fee); Geof-
frey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987) (same).
50. There are two general methodologies for calculating attorneys’ fees in class actions.  Under
the percentage method, the fee is determined as a fraction of the class recovery.  Under the lodestar
method, the fee is based on the number of hours reasonably expended by class counsel times the rea-
sonable hourly rate, and adjusted for various factors.
51. Generally, the attorneys can expect to receive an award of between 25-35%, though a court
may award any percentage of the recovery it sees fit in the particular case. See FEDERAL JUD.
CENTER, supra note 16, at 73.
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ple, the settlement process creates a list of names and addresses of people al-
legedly harmed by the defendant’s behavior.  These people will share common
interests and tastes: not only their interest in being reimbursed for the alleged
injuries they have suffered, but also their interest in the product or services that
caused them to suffer injury in the first place.  A nonpecuniary settlement tar-
geted at this specific group, with its particular concerns, can be an efficient way
for the defendant to make the class whole while at the same time conserving on
its own expenditures, for example in either for marketing and distribution or
for capital formation.  In other cases, the fact that a class action brings together
large numbers of people with similar interests may make nonpecuniary settle-
ments preferable from the standpoint of the class members.  For example, non-
pecuniary settlements may allow the class to manage more efficiently the risk
of injury or risks that members of the class will not be paid because of the de-
fendant’s intervening insolvency.  The savings to the defendant and/or to the
class can be shared among the settling parties for their mutual benefit, so that
all parties end up better off with a nonpecuniary settlement than they would be
with a cash settlement.
One might object that, while the parties may be better off, society will be
harmed because the reduced amounts defendants pay in nonpecuniary settle-
ments will translate into a lower level of deterrence of corporate misconduct.
For example, if a defendant knows it will have to pay $1000 in a nonpecuniary
settlement instead of $5000 in cash damages, the defendant will not spend more
than $1000 to prevent a defective product from reaching the market.  This may
seem like a socially inefficient outcome.  However, if the goal of social policy is
to make the defendant internalize the costs of harm, a properly structured non-
pecuniary settlement will serve deterrent purposes just as well as an all-cash
settlement.  With a nonpecuniary settlement, the defendant’s cost of liability
may be reduced, but the defendant will incur the full economic cost of its harm
because the defendant makes the class whole.  Accordingly, if properly struc-
tured, nonpecuniary settlements can fully compensate plaintiffs and increase
overall social wealth without sacrificing the goal of deterring wrongful conduct.
1. Coupon Settlements.  Coupon settlements may be desirable over cash
settlements if the defendant can save the difference between the wholesale and
the retail cost of marketing its goods or services and pass at least part of that
difference on to class members.  The coupon settlement process may be
analogized to a simple dispute between a consumer and a merchant.  Suppose,
for example, that a dry cleaner ruins a valuable suit.  The dry cleaner might be
unwilling to settle the case for the full value of the suit, in which case the
parties would have to go to small claims court to resolve the dispute (or the
customer would have to accept the loss without compensation).  But the
drycleaner might be willing to give the customer the value of the suit in store
credit.  In so doing, the drycleaner incurs only the drycleaner’s wholesale cost
of cleaning new garments, while the customer gets the benefit of drycleaning
for which the customer would have to pay retail in any event.  If, despite the
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mistake with the suit, the drycleaner is a competent provider of cleaning
services, and if the customer needs more garments drycleaned, the deal will be
advantageous to both parties:  The drycleaner retains the customer’s business,
which will be valuable in the future, while minimizing its costs by providing
store credit rather than cash and the customer gets a service at a discount.
The same principles apply in class action litigation.  Say a class of 1,000
people have been harmed by the defendant in the amount of $5 each, because
they each purchased one bottle of shampoo from a defective production run.
The full pecuniary damages needed to make the consumers whole is therefore
$5,000.  Assume that the shampoo is an excellent quality product that the con-
sumers would be happy to use again, although they would slightly prefer to
switch to a competing brand given their recent bad experience with the defen-
dant’s product.  The shampoo costs the manufacturer $2.50 per bottle to pro-
duce.  Assume further that there are no litigation costs and no attorneys’ fees.
The settlement options are as follows:
Settlement 1 Settlement 2
$5 cash Coupon for two new
bottles at $2/bottle
The defendant is clearly better off with settlement two.  A cash settlement
costs the defendant $5,000 and will not bring back any customers.  A nonpecu-
niary settlement costs the defendant at most $1,000 (assuming all coupons are
redeemed, the defendant will sell an additional 2,000 bottles of shampoo for $2
each, for a loss per bottle of $.50 and a total loss of $1,000).  The defendant
saves $4,000 on the settlement.
What about the members of the class?  This coupon settlement is beneficial
to them also, as compared with a cash settlement.  They need to buy shampoo
in any event, and they are happy to purchase the defendant’s shampoo at $5 per
bottle, although they would slightly prefer to buy a competitor’s product at the
prevailing market prices.  The cash settlement gives consumers $5 each.  The
coupon settlement, on the other hand, gives consumers a value of close to $6.
Since they have a continuing need for shampoo, they are happy to buy two bot-
tles of the defendant’s product for a total of $4.  They would otherwise be will-
ing to pay close to $10 for these products.  The consumer gets nearly $10 worth
of products for $4, for a saving of $6.  And this is a real saving, because the con-
sumer would otherwise pay $10 for a competing product.  The consumer is bet-
ter off with the coupon settlement than with a cash settlement.
What about society?  Society does not lose from a coupon settlement with
the characteristics described above.52  Assume that competitors are fully in-
formed of the settlement.  They will reduce their shampoo production by 2,000
                                                          
52. We assume that the coupon settlement does not impose excess transactions costs that out-
weigh the efficiencies of the device.
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units, because they know they will be able to sell less as a result of the settle-
ment.  Competitors lose expected profits, but this is no more a social loss than
is any competitive loss that results from a manufacturer providing a good more
cheaply to consumers.  The competitors can shift the resources that they would
have otherwise devoted to manufacturing 2,000 bottles of shampoo to other
productive uses.
Overall, social wealth is allocated more efficiently in this coupon settlement
than in an immediate cash settlement.  The losses suffered by consumers as a
result of purchasing the defective product are sunk costs with no net wealth ef-
fects for the future.  However, a coupon settlement may save various costs of
the retail distribution chain, including advertising, inventory costs, and shelf
space.  If the consumer paid retail price in the future, these costs would be built
into the price.  These are real social costs that can be conserved through a cou-
pon, as opposed to a cash, settlement.53
2. Monitoring Settlements.  Monitoring settlements offer a number of
potential economic advantages over immediate cash settlements in situations
where a defendant’s past actions are certain to impose harm on some, but not
all, class members and it is impossible to predict at present which class
members will suffer harm and how much.  The defendant’s monitoring can be a
socially efficient way to identify harm if it should develop, and the damages
paid after the harm occurs may be the most socially efficient distribution of a
limited fund to the class.  Those who develop harm will get proper treatment,
while members of the class who retain health do not receive a payment.
What would be the result of the defendant giving the class an immediate
cash settlement rather than intervening when harm develops?  A cash settle-
ment is not impossible in such a case:  Experts could be retained to determine
the likelihood of a given class member suffering harm and the probable cost to
the plaintiff.  Such testimony could, in theory, allow the settling parties to esti-
mate the present value of the expected harm to all class members.  Each class
member would receive a pro rata share of the fund, according to how likely it is
that she would develop injury.
Class members might prefer to receive pro rata shares of the settlement
fund if they are not risk averse.  However, most people dislike risk,54 and we
expect they will be risk averse especially in mass tort situations where the
harms involved can be devastating illness.  Hence, even if the expected payout
by the defendant is the same, a medical monitoring approach may be more so-
cially desirable than an immediate cash payout.  Medical monitoring offers
built-in insurance that if harm occurs, there will be money available to treat the
injury.  A cash payout would force the members of the plaintiff class to self-
insure against future harm, and acquiring this self-insurance would at the least
                                                          
53. Of course, a full calculation of social costs would also have to include the costs of structuring
and administering the nonpecuniary settlement itself.
54. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (5th ed. 1997).
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entail transactions costs.  Such insurance might be unavailable in the private
market, in which case class members who are injured might not have enough
money to treat the injury, while the class members who do not become ill can
use their damages for purposes unrelated to the defendant’s conduct.  Hence, if
class members are risk averse, they may prefer, in effect, to purchase a built-in
insurance policy with medical monitoring rather than to accept a cash payment
and self-insure.55
An additional benefit of monitoring is that it encourages early diagnosis and
treatment.  In the absence of a monitoring program, members of the class may
or may not obtain the necessary check-ups in order to detect harmful processes
before they have advanced to the point where treatment becomes more expen-
sive or impossible.56  A monitoring program can track persons known to face a
particular risk of harm in order to identify symptoms when they first appear.
3. Securities Settlements: Stocks, Puts, and Warrants.  A securities settlement
may be favored over an immediate cash payout if the present value of the secu-
rities settlement is at least comparable to the cash the class could realistically
obtain, and the securities settlement is less costly for the defendant than ob-
taining the necessary liquidity to make a cash payment.
If the defendant has the cash on hand to pay the settlement, then payment
by cash ordinarily should be favored over issuing securities.  A cash settlement
would usually be preferable from the standpoint of the corporation because it is
less costly than a securities settlement.  Stock settlements have the transaction
costs associated with filing registration statements and the potential liabilities
that attach to securities issues.  These costs are absent in a cash settlement.
There may also be costs to class members.  They may not want the company’s
securities in their portfolio and will have to incur the costs of selling the securi-
ties and putting the proceeds to other uses.
There are circumstances, however, when a defendant has little cash on hand
and a securities settlement might be the most efficient means for the defendant
to obtain a release from liability.  The securities settlement does not require the
defendant to obtain the necessary liquidity to make a cash settlement.
Consider the following two settings.  First, a corporation may be close to in-
solvency and lack the resources to make a cash payment.  In such a case, the de-
fendant will find it impossible, or nearly so, to access the capital markets to ob-
                                                          
55. It might be efficient if the settlement gave class members the option to accept a cash payout as
an alternative to monitoring relief.  However, class members are unlikely to be well informed about
the probability and cost of harm they are facing, and may accordingly accept a cash-out option too
readily.  Moreover, the take-up rate on a cash option may be so high as to reduce the number of mem-
bers remaining in the monitoring program, thus decreasing the efficiency of the monitoring if, as seems
likely, there are increasing returns to scale in this activity.
56. In the medical setting, the advantages of regular screening for certain diseases are well known
and thoroughly documented in the literature.  See, e.g., Carswell & Fleming, Whole Population
Screening for Carriers of Cystic Fibrosis, 347 THE LANCET 1421 (1996); S. Field et al., What Should be
Done About Interval Breast Cancers? Two View Mammography and a Possibly Shorter Screening In-
terval, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 203 (1995).
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tain the necessary liquidity to pay out claims.  By issuing stock, puts, options, or
warrants, the corporation can provide a form of relief with real value.  If it has
to give cash, the company might be forced into bankruptcy and class members
as nonpreferential creditors might not receive compensation.
Second, a corporation with limited cash on hand may have managers with
private information about the value of the company that is not widely known in
the market.  Managers with such information might prefer to avoid going to
capital markets to raise funds for a cash payout to class members because they
believe that the company would have to pay more for the necessary liquidity
than it would pay if the market were fully informed about the company’s pros-
pects.  A securities settlement eliminates the need for a defendant to raise
funds for a cash settlement.  The class members in effect become investors in
the corporation.  Since the corporation, in this example, is undervalued in the
market, a securities settlement saves on capital formation costs.  These savings
can be shared between the defendant and the class.  Even if a corporation does
not need to go to capital markets to fund a cash settlement, but rather uses
treasury funds, the reduction in cash on hand could inhibit the corporation’s
ability to pursue future value-enhancing projects, thereby lowering the present
value of the company.  Diluting stock value so there are more outstanding
shares would not have this effect.
Special problems arise when the class includes a large percentage of the
company’s existing shareholders.  In the limiting case, the only class members
will be all the company’s shareholders and the only defendant will be the com-
pany itself.  Here, a stock settlement would be functionally identical to a stock
dividend to shareholders.  All shareholders would have their stock diluted in
proportion to their share ownership.  In such a case, no shareholder would be
relatively better off as a result of the settlement, while the company would have
had to incur the costs of litigation and of issuing the new shares.  The plaintiffs’
attorneys would skim off value in the form of fees.  Such settlements might
conceivably be justified as a method for imposing a fine on a corporation for
socially undesirable actions, but it is doubtful that the social benefits would ex-
ceed the costs.  In most cases, however, the intersection between the class
members and the existing shareholders will be much smaller, and there will be
other defendantsnotably incumbent managersfrom whom relief can be ob-
tained.
4. Reverter Funds.  A reverter fund can be economically efficient if an
immediate cash payment to the class is impractical.  The fund is held by an
escrow agent and is protected against invasion by the defendant’s management
as well as against the claims of defendant’s creditors.  A reverter fund can be
desirable when it is costly for the class to monitor the defendant’s finances to
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ensure that the money owed the class is not spent for other purposes.57
Reverter funds provide assurance to class members that their claims will be
paid, at least up to the limits of the fund.58
The utility of reverter funds appears to be a function of two variables.  One
is the duration of the claims period.  When the payout period extends over a
long period of time, there always is a danger that business conditions will dete-
riorate or the corporation will be mismanaged, resulting in future insolvency.
As the period between settlement and payout to class members lengthens, the
probability of intervening insolvency increases, and the case for a separate es-
crow fund becomes stronger.  The other variable is the solvency of the corpora-
tion at the time of settlement.  If the company is in shaky financial condition, it
may be sensible for the parties to endow a separate fund in order to protect
those assets from other creditors, even if the period of payout is fairly short.
Such funds would presumably withstand claims by creditors of an insolvent de-
fendant as long as the transfer complies with the rules of federal bankruptcy
law.
5. Fluid Recovery Settlements.  Fluid recovery settlements can be
economically desirable when the class is large and many members of the class
cannot be identified or are unlikely to file a claim.  Even if some members of
the class do receive direct compensation from the defendant, the unidentified
or nonclaimant class members can obtain some benefit if the settlement
reaches them indirectly.  A fluid recovery typically provides this sort of indirect
benefit.  For example, the defendant may agree to reduce the price of a product
that members of the class will purchase.
The fact that nonclass members also benefit is not an objection to fluid re-
coveries.  In a well-structured fluid recovery settlement, because the defendant
must pay an amount at least equal to the amount the defendant would have to
pay if class members could readily be identified, the deterrent effect of a fluid
recovery can be the same as a cash recovery.  Further, to the extent that the
nonclass recipient of the funds is an efficient user of the resources, society can
benefit from the transfer.  Thus, with a fluid recovery, the defendant is deterred
from wrongful behavior in the future, class members who can not be identified
may receive some degree of reimbursement for their injury, and other members
of society may gain something of value as well.
                                                          
57. Monitoring advantages are one of the principal reasons found in the literature for why a bor-
rower and lender would agree to collateralize a loan.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern
of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 650-51 (1997).
58. The members of the class will benefit if the fund is fully endowed with an amount sufficient to
pay out all claims, with any amounts left over at the expiration of the claim period to be refunded to
the corporation.  However, there may be little justification for the creation of funds larger than the
largest amount reasonably expected to be paid out in claims, since such funds tie up corporate assets.
If the fund does get used up, the remaining class members could get their recovery directly from the
defendant.
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V
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST UNDESIRABLE NONPECUNIARY SETTLEMENTS
The litigation process may provide inadequate checks on the incentives
which may cause entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants to settle a
case non-optimally for the class.  Judicial scrutiny of a proposed nonpecuniary
settlement may not always be searching.  If both the plaintiffs’ attorneys and
the defendant want the settlement approved, they will not supply the judge
with information that shows that a different settlement could have been ob-
tained giving more to the class but less to class counsel.  The judge has nothing
to compare the settlement with, and the judge would prefer to settle the case
than have it continue on her docket.  The judge has before her plaintiffs’ and
defense counsel vigorously supporting the settlement.  Her decision approving
the settlement has little chance of reversal, both because there may be no one
to appeal,59 and because the standards for judicial review of settlement ap-
proval are very deferential.60  While judicial review of settlements is essential,
and capable trial court judges often perform an important public service in this
context, judicial review can usefully be supplemented by a variety of other
mechanisms that tend to validate the fairness and adequacy of a nonpecuniary
class action settlement.
In this section we consider the utility of several of these safeguards, includ-
ing repeat player law firms, objectors, cash-out provisions, and the presence of
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for class members.
A.  Repeat Players
One safeguard against undesirable nonpecuniary settlements is the role
large firms play as plaintiffs’ counsel.  Our empirical research demonstrates
that certain firms appear frequently in class action settlement notices published
in The New York Times.  By far the leading firm is Milberg Weiss Bershad Hy-
nes & Lerach, which appears in approximately a quarter of all the cases in the
sample.61
The repeat-player firms such as Milberg Weiss can have an important role
in policing against settlements that benefit the defendant at the expense of class
recovery.  Repeat player firms are experienced in class action cases, and can be
expected to represent class members with a high degree of competence.  No
large firm is likely to be tricked into a settlement that serves only the benefit of
the defendant.  Further, large firms have the resources to conduct litigation
over the long haul (for example, by paying notice costs and travel costs), and
therefore present a credible threat that if the case does not settle, they will be
                                                          
59. However, see infra text accompanying notes 63-65 on objectors.
60. Absent abuse of discretion, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.  But see General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W. 2d 949 (1996) (affirming the appellate
court’s ruling that the trial court did abuse its discretion in approving a settlement).
61. See App. I, part A.
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willing to conduct full discovery and take the case to a jury.  The fact that most
class actions do settle does not mean that large firms present no credible threat
to take the case to the trier of fact.  A case may settle because the defendant
believes that the large firm is able to take the litigation to trial, and therefore is
willing to offer more in settlement in order to reduce its exposure.  Thus, repeat
player firms can provide a significant benefit for class members by virtue of
their expertise, reputation, and capitalization.  Of course, large firms also have
an economic incentive to enter settlements that benefit them at the expense of
the class, but this incentive is shared by all plaintiff firms, large or small, and
large firms can be expected to be no worse with respect to the interests of class
members than are small firms.
More subtly, repeat player law firms guard against the reverse auctions that
may cause plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle a case for too little in order to obtain
the case for themselves over attorneys litigating in another jurisdiction.  Be-
cause these reverse auctions can generate nonpecuniary settlements, the pres-
ence of Milberg Weiss and other repeat player firms provides a potential check
on this danger.  Milberg Weiss and a few of its peer group firms have the re-
sources, knowledge, expertise, and financing to appear in virtually every juris-
diction in which a class action is brought.  Once they have appeared, they have
the clout with their fellow class action attorneys either to become lead counsel
or, at least, to exercise influence on whatever firm is selected for that role.
Milberg Weiss’s presence in all the jurisdictions where a class case is pending
thus acts as a counterweight to the danger of a reverse auction.  Even if Milberg
Weiss is not in a particular jurisdiction, the firm is important enough in the
plaintiffs’ bar that it could exact a future sanction against any plaintiffs’ firm
that engaged in a “sell out” settlement of a case.62
B.  Objectors
Recently, objectors have become a major force in class action settlements,
in part because such settlements are often controversial, and in part because
objectors sometimes earn a great deal of money by intervening.63  Objectors are
particularly likely to appear when the litigating parties propose nonpecuniary
settlements, because the settlement will nearly always be vulnerable to the ob-
jector challenging the valuation of the settlement.
One might suppose that, whatever the motives of objectors,64 their impact
on judicial review of settlements can only be positive; they will bring defects in
                                                          
62. For example, Milberg Weiss could use its power as lead counsel to deprive the offending firm
of remunerative work in future cases.
63. A Wall Street Journal article recently chronicled some of the fees obtained by objectors in
large class actions.  See Richard B. Schmitt, Objecting to Class-Action Pacts Can Be Lucrative for At-
torneys, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, at B1.  In one case, a mediator had originally recommended that
the lawyers who filed an objection be paid $400,000, but when the objectors appealed the settlement,
class counsel upped the ante to $1 million whereupon the appeal was dropped.  See id.
64. Some objectors are simply uninformed class members who write to the court, or, less com-
monly, appear during the settlement hearing, to voice opinions having little relevance to the matters
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the settlement to the attention of the court, and may enhance the settlement for
the benefit of the class or reduce the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees that class mem-
bers might have to pay. It may appear that objectors act as a safeguard per-
forming a useful service by subjecting nonpecuniary settlements to adversary
testing, thus calling the court’s attention to adverse features of the settlement
that counsel for the settling parties wish to disguise.  Objectors do, indeed,
sometimes obtain improvements in settlements, although in the majority of
cases, objectors fail to alter the terms of the original proposal.65
However, this perspective ignores a number of factors.  First, the objection
itself has costs, because the objector, to make his or her threat credible, may at-
                                                          
under consideration.  For example, it is not uncommon for class members to object to the settlement
on the ground that they believe the defendant has done nothing wrong—a commendably loyal opinion,
but one with no relevance in a settlement hearing.
A second class of objectors includes dissident plaintiffs’ attorneys who have fallen out with lead
counsel.  The threat to object to the settlement is always a factor in the negotiations among the attor-
neys in the plaintiffs consortium.  If these negotiations break down, the loser sometimes carries
through with the threat. The true basis of the objection is nearly always the fact that the objecting at-
torney believes that he or she is not receiving sufficient compensation from lead counsel on the plain-
tiffs’ side.  However, unless relations among the attorneys in the plaintiffs’ consortium have broken
down altogether, the dissident attorney usually hopes for an increased fee in return for dropping the
objection.  Accordingly, the dissident attorney is likely to be deterred from pointing out fatal defects
because to do so might destroy the settlement from which the attorney still hopes to obtain a fee.
A third class might be termed “sokaiya” objectors.  Sokaiya are figures in Japan who specialize in
disrupting shareholders meetings by complaining loudly about management’s alleged incompetence or
poor performance.  See DAVID E. KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: THE EXPLOSIVE ACCOUNT OF
JAPAN’S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD 172-73 (1986).  Mark West describes the problem as follows:
These rent-a-thugs, or as they prefer to call themselves, “professional shareholders,” began to
perfect their blackmail techniques, which now take a variety of forms.  Some sokaiya groups
call themselves “consulting groups” or “research institutes” and engage in the collection of
“corporate data.”  This “data,” which usually consists of intimate details about the personal
lives of management, is sold to the company for an exorbitant “consulting fee.” More inven-
tive hoods have perfected the art of making offers that management can’t refuse.  These so-
kaiya groups arrange beauty contests that companies are strong-armed into sponsoring, or-
ganize golf tournaments with excessively high entrance fees for Tokyo businessmen, and host
kabuki plays at which ticket prices cost five times their normal price.
Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and The United States, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 1436, 1451-52 (1994).  Class action practice in the United States has developed its own co-
hort of professional objectors: attorneys who enter a case after a settlement is announced, manage not
only to object to the settlement but to intervene as counsel on behalf of a class member, and then
threaten to disrupt the settlement unless they are given a hefty reward.  Their threat is not an idle one.
As long as they can intervene, they can appeal the settlement as of right, and during the appeal proc-
ess, the settlement will be in limbo.  Class counsel will not be paid and class members will not receive
their benefits.  The prospect of delaying a settlement for months or years by taking an appeal is the
realistic threat that objectors hold over the heads of the settling parties.  These days, professional ob-
jectors can include, not only private attorneys, but also, in some cases, state Attorneys General who
see the political and economic benefits in claiming public credit for reducing counsel fees or enhancing
class settlements.  Obviously, the term “sokaiya” for this type of objector is used here in a tongue-in-
cheek fashion; professional objectors to class action settlements are attorneys in good standing who
utilize perfectly legal means to contest settlements, and have no criminal intent.
In addition to the first three categories of objector we have identified—uninformed class members,
dissident plaintiffs’ attorneys, and sokaiya objectors—there are institutional investors, public interest
groups, individual attorneys, and others who make a bona fide attempt to improve the settlement.
65. The Federal Judicial Center study, for example, found that in cases where objections were
filed, more than 90% of the settlements were approved without change.  See FEDERAL JUD. CENTER,
supra note 16, at 58.
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tempt to engage in discovery related to the settlement and may even attempt to
take depositions of counsel or their experts.  Second, threats are never effective
unless they are occasionally exercised.  Objectors will therefore sometimes ap-
peal class action settlements.  Appeal of a class settlement is unlikely to be suc-
cessful, given the large discretion enjoyed by trial courts in assessing their fair-
ness.  But the appeal process is costly and, above all, will delay the award of
relief to class members.
Perhaps most troubling is the ex ante effects of objections.  These days,
when parties negotiate any major class settlement, especially one involving
nonpecuniary relief, they expect to see objectors appear.  They anticipate,
therefore, that they may have to change the terms of the settlement in order to
satisfy objectors.  In consequence, they are likely to adjust the settlement pro-
posed to the court to allow a margin for satisfying objectors while ending up
with the same settlement they would have reached had objectors not played a
role.  Suppose for example that if the parties know no objector will appear,
they will reach a settlement equal in value to $1,000 for the class and an attor-
neys’ fee of $200.  If they know, however, that an objector is waiting in the
wings, ready to intervene and threaten an appeal of any judicial order approv-
ing the settlement, instead of proposing the settlement in the absence of an
objector, they propose a settlement equal in value to $800 and an attorneys fee
of $300.  Now when the objector appears, they can adjust the settlement as a
purported compromise that sweetens the deal for the class by agreeing to raise
the class relief to $950, drop the attorneys’ fee to $200, and pay the objector $50
for his or her services:
Recipient(s) Settlement 1
(without objector)
Settlement 2
(expecting objector)
Settlement 3
(after objection)
Class
Class counsel
Objector
        $1,000
        $   200
           $800
           $300
           $950
           $200
           $  50
In this example, settlement 3, the end of the process of objection, is inferior
from the class’s perspective to the settlement that would be reached if no objec-
tion were anticipated.  It is also inferior from a social point of view, both be-
cause class members do not receive the full compensation they could under set-
tlement 1, and because it provides an incentive for objectors to appear whose
only function ex ante is to increase the transaction costs of the settlement and to
expropriate a portion of its value.
Notice, moreover, that the process has several other undesirable features.
First, it is possible that no objector will appear.  If no objector appears, the liti-
gation will culminate with settlement 2, which is even less desirable from the
class’s point of view than settlement 3 (the class obtains only $800 in relief
rather than $950), and which represents a windfall for plaintiffs’ counsel who
anticipated an objection and did not receive one.  Second, the process of objec-
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tion itself tends to validate the settlement.  It might appear that, given a settle-
ment that has been proposed, objected to, and sweetened, the settlement has
undergone appropriate adversarial testing and, in the process, been improved
so as to be fair to the class.  The example shows that this is not necessarily the
case.
C.  Cash-out Provisions
Cash-out provisions can mitigate some of the problems we have identified
with nonpecuniary relief, especially in the case of coupon settlements.  Cash-
out provisions place a floor on the cash value of the settlement, and provide an
option to persons who will not take advantage of the nonpecuniary relief.  It is
not necessary that the cash-out provision be as valuable as the stated or par
value of the nonpecuniary relief.  Indeed, the cash-out relief ought in every case
be less than the available nonpecuniary relief; otherwise many class members
would elect the cash option and the efficiency benefits of nonpecuniary relief
would be lost.
For the cash-out provision to be effective, the settlement should not impose
unduly burdensome conditions on class members wishing to exercise it.  If too
many conditions are placed on the cash-out option, the transaction costs of the
option will make it too costly to be worth exercising.  An example of seemingly
onerous conditions is found in the Computer Monitor Cases settlement.66  The
settlement provides that class members have a right to a $6.00 cash payment in-
stead of a coupon for a $13.00 rebate on the purchase of new equipment.  How-
ever, the fine print of the settlement states that the cash payment can be ob-
tained only if the class member submits a completed rebate form at the end of
the rebate period.  The rebate period expires on September 8, 2000.  It is un-
likely that many class members will keep their rebate forms and submit them
for $6.00 in cash after the turn of the centurynot only because six dollars
three years from now is worth less than six dollars today, but because people
are likely to lose or forget about their coupons.
D.  ADR Procedures
Recently, a number of nonpecuniary settlements have appeared with an al-
ternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) feature, which is available to any class
member who does not want to accept the general class relief.67  The ADR pro-
gram sets up a form of arbitration with an expedited and inexpensive eviden-
tiary process, using a variety of presumptions to aid in fact-finding.  Under the
terms of the ADR procedure, plaintiffs who manage to satisfy a variety of rela-
tively simple presumptions are entitled to relief that potentially exceeds the
                                                          
66. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
67. An example is the settlement in Michels v. Phoenix Home Mut. Ins. Co., Index No. 5318- 95,
N.Y. Sup. Ct. (County of Albany), Notice of Settlement, May 1997, published in N.Y. TIMES, May
1997.  Class members could take a form of coupon settlement offering them general policy relief on
whole or universal life policies, or they had the option of taking advantage of an ADR procedure.
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value of the relief which they would be entitled to as members of the class un-
der the general nonpecuniary settlement.
The ADR procedure is a valuable option that can provide class members
with some kind of hearing, and enhanced relief, without requiring them to opt
out of the settlement and bring their own separate litigation.  Depending on
how it is structured, ADR can mitigate some of the problems with nonpecuni-
ary settlements.  To work adequately, the ADR process should provide for
streamlined procedures that still take account of the differences in individual
cases and allow a degree of individualized adjudication before a neutral arbitra-
tor, with the prospect of more favorable relief at the end of the process for
those parties who are able to establish that they have stronger-than-average
claims.
However, two potential downsides of ADR must be noted.  First, if the
ADR is too favorable compared with the general class settlement, the take-up
rate of the ADR may be so great that it vitiates the benefits of the nonpecuni-
ary relief, which depend in part on the efficiencies of a pre-formed class of per-
sons with similar interests.  Second, ADR procedures have a built-in adverse
selection problem in cases where the strength of claims varies substantially
from member to member.  The class members with stronger claims may tend to
select out of the nonpecuniary relief into the ADR process where they are
likely to receive a more favorable settlement, leaving those persons with the
weaker claims to take the nonpecuniary award.  The parties may then reduce
the value of the general relief, taking into account that weaker claims will be
remaining after some members have elected to proceed via ADR.  But weak-
ening the general relief increases the likelihood that class members will opt out
of the settlement entirely or will elect to use the ADR process. This recursive-
ness may make it hard to structure an effective ADR program in nonpecuniary
cases.
VI
STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NONPECUNIARY SETTLEMENTS
Courts currently review nonpecuniary settlements according to the same
standard as cash settlements:  Is the settlement fair, adequate, and reasonable?
This test becomes difficult to administer in the nonpecuniary setting because of
the valuation problems already discussed.  To clarify analysis, courts engaging
in fairness review of nonpecuniary settlements should apply a cash equivalency
test:  Is the settlement under consideration as good or better, within a range of
reasonable error, for the members of the class than what realistically could be
expected in a cash settlement?
Three general points are pertinent at the outset.  First, it is evident that
some parts of this test are open-ended and subject to interpretation.  For in-
stance, in evaluating whether a nonpecuniary settlement is “as good or better
for the members of the class than what realistically could be expected in a cash
settlement” the court could decide to look at the settlement’s expected value to
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the entire class and compare that value with a cash settlement, or the court
could look at the median value to the class and ignore outlier effects.  In this
manner, the cash equivalency test can and should be fleshed out by judges in
the context of deciding actual cases.
Second, we emphasize that the relevant comparison is not between the ac-
tual value of the nonpecuniary settlement and its par or stated value.  It is ob-
vious that nonpecuniary settlements usually will be less valuable to the class
than the face value of the settlement.  Instead, the proper comparison is with
the amount of any cash settlement that realistically could be expected from the
litigation.  If the expected actual value of the nonpecuniary settlement is as
good or better than the realistically available cash settlement, the judge can
conclude that the nonpecuniary settlement is in the best interest of the class
and should be approved.
A third consideration is that the comparison between the nonpecuniary set-
tlement under review and the hypothetical best available cash settlement must
be made within fairly broad margins of error.  Ordinarily, the court will not
have access to precise and reliable information about what cash settlements
would have been available had the parties followed that route.  A court apply-
ing the test must make its judgment based on the best information available,
which is unlikely to resolve the issue with precision.68  Trial court discretion
should be exercised wisely in adjudicating the desirableness of a particular
nonpecuniary settlement using the cash equivalency test.
What follows is a series of factors that might be evaluated by courts re-
viewing each type of nonpecuniary settlement.  The suggested factors help
analyze whether the nonpecuniary settlement meets the requirements of the
cash equivalency test.
A.  Coupon Settlements
In reviewing a coupon settlement, the court should consider whether the de-
fendant is saving on transactions costs of marketing and distributing goods or
services to customers, and, if so, whether some of those savings are passed on to
the class.  This is an indication of an efficient settlement.  Among the most im-
portant factors for the court to consider are the following:
1.  To what extent is the good or service covered by the coupon one that
members of the class might want to purchase?  If the item is usually purchased
                                                          
68. However, there may be some evidence on the issue.  For example, the parties may have con-
sidered a cash payment during the course of their  settlement negotiations.  If so, the amounts of cash
consideration offered or demanded would be relevant considerations—along with the court’s assess-
ment of the degree to which negotiations over a cash settlement were serious and in good faith.  The
parties may have performed independent appraisals of the cash value of the case ex ante, which would
be relevant although not dispositive given the fact that such appraisals may be conducted before dis-
covery.  Expert witnesses could be enlisted to offer testimony on the reasonable cash value of a settle-
ment as compared with the value of the nonpecuniary relief actually obtained.  And trial courts with
experience in litigation can often bring a practiced eye to bear on the settlement in order to assess
whether the nonpecuniary relief is as good or better than what could have been obtained in cash.
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on a one-time basis, this should count against the reasonableness of the settle-
ment.  On the other hand, if the item is something that most members of the
class purchase on a fairly regular basis, this should count in favor of the settle-
ment.
2.  To what extent does the good or service have idiosyncratic features that
make it a poor substitute for products offered by others?  For example, many
people use perfume or cologne, but for most consumers, brands of scent are not
fungible.  The scent a consumer uses is a personal choice, and it would not be
useful for a consumer to receive a coupon to purchase a perfume that she does
not use.  (However, if the consumer already has indicated a preference for a
brand by an initial purchase that went bad, that brand may still be the preferred
scent and be a brand the consumer would purchase again.)  On the other hand,
most car owners do not have strong preferences about the brand of tire they
use, so long as they obtain the qualities they desire in terms of durability and
performance.  To the extent that the desirability of the item covered by a cou-
pon settlement depends on personal idiosyncrasies, the item is less desirable for
coupon treatment; on the other hand, if consumers will accept substitution of
brands, the item will be more appropriate for coupon treatment.
3.  How soon is the average class member likely to use the coupon?  If cus-
tomers are likely to use their coupons quickly, this weighs in favor of the set-
tlement.  On the other hand, if the item requires replacement infrequently, this
will count against the usefulness of a coupon.  If there is a long delay before
using the coupon, consumers may lose, misplace, or forget about them.
4.  How long are the coupons valid?  For items that are frequently pur-
chased, a fairly short claim period would be appropriate in order to reduce the
costs of administering the settlement.  If items are not frequently purchased, an
abbreviated claim period may be unreasonable because the coupon may have
expired by the time a class member needs the item.
5.  To what extent are coupons transferable?  If the settlement allows free
transfer of coupons, this counts in favor of approval.  If some restrictions on
transfer are in place, these may be justified as necessary to protect the defen-
dant against the risk of sudden and unforeseen redemptions, affording a higher
degree of reliability in estimating the take-up rate.  Severe restrictions on trans-
ferability usually counsel against approval except in unusual circumstances, be-
cause such restrictions reduce coupon utilization and discriminate, within the
class, between members who have a use for the product and ones who do not.
B.  Monitoring
When members of the class cannot determine whether they have suffered
harm from the defendant’s actions, monitoring settlements offer potential
benefits. The court should focus on two areas.  First, are class members risk
averse and is insurance costly?  If so, a monitoring settlement may offer a form
of built-in insurance with low transactions costs.  Second, will monitoring per-
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mit early diagnosis and treatment of medical or product-related harm?  This
can save lives or reduce costs.  More specifically tailored factors include:
1.  To what degree are class members risk averse with respect to the harm
involved?  If the harm is only slight, the class members may not be particularly
risk averse, whereas if the harm is severeas in some medical monitoring cases
in which the class members are at risk of devastating physical illnessthe pres-
ence of risk aversion can easily be inferred.  The greater the risk aversion
among class members, the greater the utility of monitoring as compared with
cash relief.
2.  To what degree is insurance readily available to class members to cover
the risks involved?  If class members can readily obtain insurance in the mar-
ket, it may be better to award them a cash settlement and allow them to obtain
the amount of insurance that, in view of their own tastes and preferences, they
desire.  On the other hand, if insurance is costly, the case for monitoring be-
comes stronger.
3.  How likely is it that the class members will suffer the harm for which re-
lief is sought?  This factor is somewhat complicated, because monitoring ap-
pears most appropriate when the risk of harm is in an intermediate range.
When the risk of harm is large, monitoring may not be required for risk-
reduction purposes because one can predict that the class member will suffer
the harm.  In the limiting case, if it is known that all class members will suffer a
harm of $1,000 within two years, it hardly makes sense to institute a monitoring
program.  Because everyone will suffer the harm, it would make more sense to
provide them with an immediate cash payment.  Similarly, when the risk of
harm is very slight, monitoring may not be appropriate because the costs of
monitoring may outweigh the savings obtained.  However, when the risk of
harm is in the intermediate range, such that class members have a significantly
above-average probability of suffering a particular condition, monitoring is
likely to be valuable.
4.  How predictable is the timing and extent of harm if it occurs?  In some
cases, it may be possible to predict when a class member will suffer harm, and
how great the harm will be.  When damages are predictable, there is relatively
less reason to institute a monitoring program in order to reduce risk because
harm that occurs within a definite time period is less risky than unpredictable
harm.
5.  To what degree can early diagnosis and treatment reduce the costs of
harm?  If early diagnosis and treatment can significantly reduce costs, there is a
strong case for monitoring.  On the other hand, if early diagnosis and treatment
can do little to alleviate the harm or economize on treatment costs, the case for
monitoring is correspondingly weaker.
C.  Securities Settlements
With respect to securities settlements, the court should consider the fol-
lowing factors:
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1. Is there evidence that the defendant’s cost of capital makes a securities
settlement more valuable to the class than a cash settlement?  If the defendant
is in shaky financial condition, a securities settlement might be desirable be-
cause the defendant would have to pay a risk premium in capital markets to
raise the money for a  cash settlement.  This leaves less money available for the
class out of the sum total devoted to settlement funds. Similarly, if the defen-
dant’s management has nonpublic information about the firm that indicates
that its cost of capital is higher than it would be if the market were fully in-
formed, this factor might counsel in favor of a securities settlement since some
of the defendant’s savings in capital formation could be passed on to the mem-
bers of the class.69
2.  Is the security involved listed and traded on a developed market?  If it is,
the security can be valued and compared to a potential cash settlement.
Moreover, provided there are no transfer restrictions in place, the presence of a
ready market allows holders to liquidate their positions if they prefer to invest
in some other asset or use the value of the settlement for consumption.  How-
ever, restrictions on transfer may be justified by business or legal reasons; for
example, if the stock is issued as an offering exempt from registration under the
securities law, there may be good reason to impose restrictions on resale.70  In
deciding if a restricted transfer securities settlement is desirable, the court
should balance the costs to the class of the restrictions on transfer against the
costs to the defendant of paying a cash settlement.
3. What happened to the price of the company’s stock in public markets
around the time the potential settlement was announced?  If the market’s ex-
pectation of the settlement value bears a relationship to the value of the case,
which would be expected in an efficient and well-informed market, then the
market’s reaction to the announced settlement could be an indicator as to
whether the settlement is equivalent in value to the best available cash settle-
ment. 71  Other things equal, if the company’s existing stock goes down relative
to the market, it can be inferred that the settlement exceeds the market’s ex-
pectations.  If, on the other hand, the defendant’s stock goes up relative to the
market, one might infer that the market was expecting a more expensive set-
tlement and was pleasantly surprised by how cheaply the company was able to
purchase a release from liability. 
                                                          
69. However, it may be difficult to establish the existence of such nonpublic information when the
defendant’s stock is trading on a developed stock market such as the New York Stock Exchange.
70. It should be noted that the class member may lose less from a restriction on resale of stock if
the company is expected to stay in business than from a similar restriction on transfer of a coupon in a
coupon settlement.  The stock will remain indefinitely in the holder’s portfolio, whereas the coupon
may never be used and may eventually become worthless.
71. While share price effects are important, however, they should not be overestimated.  It is far
from clear that the market operates in an efficient manner with respect to litigation risk—especially
given the confidential nature of much of the information involved in litigation.  The performance of
the company’s stock in response to an announced settlement, even if it is informed, will reflect only the
market’s assessment of the difference between the predicted settlement and the settlement actually
reached.  This does not necessarily indicate that the settlement is fair.
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D.  Reverter Funds
In the case of reverter funds, one might suppose that the court should have
no objection to the creation of a pool of money that can help the class by se-
curing payment of the defendant’s obligations.  However, the creation of a re-
verter fund is not necessarily an efficient method of class compensation.  In
creating the fund, the defendant ties up capital that it might want to use for
other profitable investments.  If the defendant would be better off not tying up
capital, and the class members would be well secured in any event, then it
might be less desirable for the parties to establish a fund than for them to pro-
vide for payment directly from the defendant.  Reverter funds also may be un-
desirable to the defendant if the court awards attorneys’ fees on the percentage
method and calculates the percentage on the basis of the entire value of the
fund, rather than on the amount claimed by the class.  A court considering this
type of relief should determine whether the parties have good reasons for pro-
viding this sort of security to the class members:
1.  How extended is the claim period?  If the claim period is brief, the need
for a segregated fund may be small, because there is a low probability that the
defendant will become insolvent or use the money for investment and make the
class members wait for payment.  If the claim period is extended, however, the
case for a segregated fund is stronger, because as the time between settlement
and claim grows larger, there is a greater risk of insolvency or other intervening
cause harmful to the plaintiffs.
2.  How strong is the defendant’s financial condition at time of settlement?
If the defendant is in shaky condition, the class may obtain a substantial benefit
from the creation of a segregated fund immune from the claims of defendant’s
other creditors.  If, on the other hand, the defendant is well capitalized, there is
relatively less cause to establish such a fund.
3. How much is in the fund relative to the amounts of potential claims?  If
the fund is insufficient to satisfy claims reasonably expected during the settle-
ment period, it may offer little benefit and, indeed, may be harmful because
class members may be misled by the existence of a fund into believing that their
claims are fully secured when in fact they are not.  On the other hand, if the
fund is grossly in excess of the amount class members can reasonably be ex-
pected to claim, a court might be concerned that the fund was established in
order to create a high valuation for the recovery, and thereby to increase the
fees of class counsel at the expense of the class.
E.  Fluid Recovery
In evaluating the desirability of a fluid recovery class settlement, the court
should consider whether individualized relief is feasible and if so, at what cost
to the defendant.  Also, the court should ask if fluid recovery is a better deter-
rent to the defendant and others similarly situated than individualized relief.
Considerations include the following factors:
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1.  How difficult is it to locate class members?  If class members would be
hard to identify, the court should consider whether a fluid recovery would be
preferable from a social viewpoint than individualized recovery.  Since fluid re-
covery exacts the full settlement amount from the defendant, this technique can
optimally deter the defendant; if many class members can not be located, indi-
vidualized relief imposes less deterrence on the defendant.
2.  Who will be the noninjured recipients of the fluid recovery?  Assuming
the fluid recovery either supports a price decrease, or is used to fund research
or education, it is likely members of the class will not be the only people to
benefit from the fund.  The fund should not be controlled by plaintiffs’ attor-
neys, because the money may be directed to causes that benefit the attorneys’
interests, rather than the best interests of the class or other people in similar
situations.  On the other hand, fluid recoveries can provide some benefits to
injured class members who do not receive compensation directly.  The court
should evaluate the proposed relief with a realistic sense of what can actually
be achieved in the circumstances of the case.
3.  If individual class members can be identified, are there onerous or con-
fusing prerequisites the members must comply with in order to obtain relief in
the absence of a fluid recovery?  If facilitating individualized class recovery re-
quires claimants to supply detailed information that most people either have
not maintained or do not have at hand, the inconvenience or impossibility of
complying with settlement requirements will reduce the number of claimants
and exclude legitimate class members from recovery.  However, if the require-
ments are designed to assure against fraudulent claims, then some amount of
inconvenience to class members may be acceptable; if the cost of inconvenience
is too high, then the class will not benefit from the recovery and a fluid recov-
ery may be the desirable form of settlement.
VII
CONCLUSION
This article has provided an analysis of nonpecuniary class action settle-
ments: coupons, securities, monitoring, reverter funds, and fluid recoveries.  It
provides economic arguments for and against these settlements.  The argument
against is well understood in the literature; it is based on the theory that class
counsel operating as entrepreneurs can enrich themselves at the expense of the
class by manipulating the settlement into a nonpecuniary form which, because
it is difficult to value, can be passed off as more beneficial to the class than it
actually is.
The arguments for nonpecuniary class action settlements are less well un-
derstood.  We suggest that each of the forms of nonpecuniary relief can be jus-
tified on economic grounds, at least in theory, as a means for providing benefits
to the defendant or the plaintiff class that can be shared between the settling
parties, making both sides better off.  Moreover, nonpecuniary settlements can
utilize the built-in structure of the class action to enhance these benefits.  Cou-
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pon settlements provide a potentially efficient means for marketing goods and
services to consumers that conserves on costs such as inventory, advertising,
and distribution.  Monitoring settlements have two economic advantages:  They
reduce risk for class members relative to cash settlements, and may conserve
social resources and minimize harm by offering the potential for early diagnosis
and treatment of harmful conditions.  Securities settlements offer efficiencies in
the capital formation process.  Reverter funds provide a form of security to
class members that protects their benefits against invasion either by the defen-
dant or by its creditors.  Fluid recoveries can be an efficient means for deterring
corporate misconduct when class members entitled to relief are difficult to
identify on an individual basis.
We suggest that there are safeguards in the litigation process that may pro-
tect the class from abuse of nonpecuniary settlements.  It is a positive factor if
one or more of the larger class action firms is present in court on the plaintiffs’
side, because these firms offer a combination of expertise in class action prac-
tice, a reputation to uphold, and the ability to resist reverse auctions by defen-
dants who seek to bargain among competing teams of plaintiffs’ attorneys.  The
presence of a cash-out option, provided that the option is a real one and not
freighted with conditions that make it so inconvenient as to be worth little, is
also beneficial.  Alternative dispute resolution procedures can be valuable sup-
plements to nonpecuniary settlements if they are not unduly burdensome and
are structured to avoid adverse selection problems in the structure of the basic
nonpecuniary relief.  However, despite the apparent benefit they offer the class
and the court by bringing adverse aspects of the settlement to the attention of
the judge and sweetening deals from time to time, objectors may actually offer
little to the settlement process because of ex ante effects and the incentives that
objectors have in the process.
The judicial analysis of nonpecuniary settlements should be based on a for-
mula of cash equivalency:  Is the settlement under consideration as good or bet-
ter, within a range of reasonable error, for the members of the class than what
realistically could be expected in a cash settlement?  We suggest a number of
factors that a court may consider in evaluating the fairness, adequacy, and rea-
sonableness of settlements under the cash equivalency test.  These considera-
tions are specific to the particular form of nonpecuniary relief in issue; the rele-
vant factors bear on the question whether the relief being proposed offers the
prospects of real savings in economic efficiency, compared to an immediate, all-
cash settlement to injured class members.
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APPENDIX A
EMPIRICAL DATA
A.  An Empirical Overview of Nonpecuniary Settlements
For a number of reasons it is difficult to assess the importance and fre-
quency of nonpecuniary settlements on a statistically reliable basis.  Settle-
ments are approved by the court, but decisions approving settlements are rarely
reported.  Hence, any analysis based on settlements in published court deci-
sions will both be scant in data and biased toward the more legally controver-
sial cases that get published.  There are data on securities class action settle-
ments, but these are limited to a particular type of litigation and, accordingly,
do not provide information on other important classes of settlement (such as
consumer or mass tort cases).  The journal Class Action Reports contains valu-
able descriptions of some class actions, including settlements, but coverage is
spotty and unsystematic.  Case information is maintained by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts and by a number of state courts, but cases are not
coded according to class action status and therefore are hard to locate.
For lack of a better source of information, we searched The New York
Times for class action notices from January 1993 through September 1997.72
This generated a sample of 127 cases.  We have categorized the notices ac-
cording to several criteria, including the nature of the court, the case type, and
the settlement type.  We also have reviewed the attorneys whose names are on
the settlement notices, identifying the six most frequently appearing firms.73
The results of the empirical study are detailed in the tables below.  Most of
the class actions noticed in The New York Times are brought in federal court.
As might be expected, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York are
strongly represented.  However, there are cases from a fairly wide variety of
other courts, including quite a few state courts.  The court breakdown is sum-
marized in the following table:74
                                                          
72. In addition to the New York Times data set, we searched the Westlaw and LEXIS databases
for nonpecuniary class action settlements.  This search generated a number of additional settlements
that provide good examples and information on the dynamics of the settlement process. We have not
included the cases generated in the Westlaw and LEXIS searches in the data base drawn from the New
York Times because of the differences between the two sources of data.
73. Obviously, the New York Times data set is subject to challenge as not being particularly repre-
sentative of the universe of class action cases.  It will tend to focus on cases involving New York de-
fendants or New York counsel, and, because of New York’s prominence as a financial center, will tend
to include a disproportionate share of securities cases.  Nevertheless, because the New York Times is a
newspaper with national status, it is likely to include a large number of the major, nationwide cases.
74. The percentages in this and the following tables may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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TABLE A1
COURT BREAKDOWN
Southern District of New York  22%
Eastern District of New York    6%
Other Federal Districts  47%
New York State Court  10%
Other State Courts  14%
We divide the cases into the following categories: antitrust, consumer, em-
ployment, securities, tort, and other (obviously, judgment calls were required
about the nature of some cases).  Most of the class actions were securities cases.
Consumer cases are also well represented, many involving claims by mortga-
gors against the companies that originate, service, or hold their mortgages.
TABLE A2
CASE BREAKDOWN
Antitrust   3%
Consumer 30%
Employment   4%
Securities 58%
Tort   4%
Other   2%
We divide the settlements into seven types: cash, coupon, monitoring, stock,
fluid recovery, unknown (that is, the settlement type could not be determined
from the class action notice), and other.  In categorizing the settlements, we at-
tempt to identify the predominant characteristic.  Most settlements have some
cash component, but where other types of relief are included, the cash element
usually appears to be less significant than the nonpecuniary element, and/or
was principally used to compensate the attorneys in cases where the class
members received nonpecuniary relief.  We could not separately identify
whether a particular settlement contained a reverter provision because this in-
formation was not contained in the settlement notices.  The breakdown does
not support the claim sometimes heard in policy circles that coupon settlements
have become a major part of the class action landscape.  While there are a sub-
stantial number of nonpecuniary settlements, including coupons, securities, and
monitoring relief, the predominant relief is the cash settlement in which plain-
tiffs receive real dollars to compensate them for their harm.
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TABLE A3
SETTLEMENT BREAKDOWN
Cash 43%
Coupons 10%
Monitoring    2%
Securities    6%
Fluid Recovery    2%
Unknown  34%
Other    1%
Finally, we consider the presence of repeat players on the plaintiffs’ side, to
assess the now-familiar claim that class action litigation is dominated by a few
small firms that exercise monopolistic or other form of market dominance.75
The six firms whose names appear most frequently on the class notices are Mil-
berg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach; Abbey, Gardy & Squittier; Zimmerman,
Reed PLLP; Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP; Berger & Mon-
tague; and Weiss & Yourman.76  We determine in how many cases each of these
firms appeared (when two or more of the six leading firms appear in the same
case, we count the case in each firm’s tally).  Consistent with expectations, Mil-
berg Weiss is by far the leading firm, followed by a number of firms with about
the same share of the cases.  It should be noted that these figures probably un-
derstate the frequency with which the largest firms are involved in cases, be-
cause class action notices published in newspapers frequently omit mention of
all the plaintiffs’ firms.  The following table shows the frequency of each repeat
player’s appearance as class counsel.
TABLE A4
CLASS COUNSEL BREAKDOWN (NO. OF CASES)
Milberg Weiss     34
Abbey, Gardner & Squittier       9
Zimmerman, Reed PLLP     11
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP       8
Berger & Montague       8
Weiss & Yourman       6
                                                          
75. Milberg Weiss, the reputed leader among plaintiffs’ lawyers, was responsible for filing 193
cases between 1988 and mid-1995.  See Karen Donovan, Heeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee’s Back, FORBES, Aug.
26, 1996, at 78.
76. Somewhat surprisingly, several leading plaintiffs’ firmse.g., Stull, Stull & Brody and Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernsteinwere not among the top six firms in the sample.
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The following table provides the complete breakdown of the cases from the
New York Times data set.
TABLE A5
NEW YORK TIMES DATA SET
Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
In re Abbey Healthcare
Securities Litigation
10/96 C.D. Cal. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss
In re Action Savings
Bank, SLA Securities
Litigation
ND D.N.J. Securities Cash
Akerman v. Greater New
York Savings Bank
7/93 E.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown Weiss &
Yourman
In re Ambase ND S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown
In re American Travelers
Corp. Securities Litiga-
tion
ND E.D. Pa. Securities Cash
In re Ames Department
Stores, Inc. Debenture
Litigation
5/93 S.D.N.Y. Securities Securities Milberg
Weiss
In re Ann Taylor Stores
Securities Litigation
2/93 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Bernstein
Litowitz
Arnold v. Unlimited
Artists Theatre Circuit
4/96 N.D. Cal. Employment Other
Backstrom v. Methodist
Hospital
7/95 S.D. Tex. Consumer Cash
Ballan v. Ezcony
Interamerica, Inc.
7/94 S.D. Fla. Securities Unknown
In re Banpais, S.A.
Securities Litigation
10/95 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss
In re Bausch & Lomb 8/96 N.D. Ala. Consumer Coupon
Berlinsky v. Alcatel
Alstholm Compagne
D’Electricite
2/97 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Weiss &
Yourman
Blatt v. Bertolli U.S.A.,
Inc.
ND Cal. Su-
per. Ct.
Consumer Coupon Milberg
Weiss
In re Ivan F. Boesky
Securities Litigation
6/97 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Berger &
Montague
Britt v. Global Tel*Link
Corp.
9/95 Ala. Cir.
Ct.
Consumer Cash
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Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
Burleson v. Independent
One Mortgage Corp.
8/94 Minn. St.
Ct.
Consumer Cash
Carter v. The Global
Privatization Fund, Inc.
ND S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown
Capital Holdings, Inc. v.
NYNEX Mobile
Communications Co.
4/95 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Consumer Unknown Milberg
Weiss
Charlston-COAD v.
Cunard Line, Ltd.
11/95 S.D.N.Y. Consumer Cash
In re Cheyenne Software,
Inc. Securities Litigation
7/96 E.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss
In re Citisource, Inc.
Securities Litigation
1/94 S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown
Cohan v. Loucke, Jr. 4/93 Del. Ch. Securities Cash
Cohen v. Apache Corp. 1/93 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash
Collins v. Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corp.
4/96 D.D.C. Employment Cash
In re Columbia Securities
Litigation
ND S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash
In re Computer
Associates, Int’l, Inc.
Securities Litigation
10/93 E.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown Abbey
Computer Monitor Cases 4/97 Cal. Su-
per. Ct.
Consumer Coupon Milberg
Weiss
In re Coram Healthcare
Corp. Securities
Litigation
11/96 D. Colo. Securities Securities Milberg
Weiss,
Abbey
In re Comptronix
Securities Litigation
9/93 N.D. Ala. Securities Cash Bernstein
Litowitz
In re Cordis Corp.
Pacemaker Product
Liability Litigation
7/95 S.D. Ohio Tort Cash
In re Corrpro
Companies, Inc.
Securities Litigation
3/97 N.D. Ohio Securities Securities
Cosmopolitan Care Class
Action Litigation
ND Not Listed Employment Cash
In re Crazy Eddie
Securities Litigation
ND E.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss,
Abbey
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Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
In re C&S Sovran
Shareholder Litigation
4/94 N.D. Ga. Securities Unknown
Curran v. Mascotte 6/96 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Securities Unknown Abbey
In re Dataware
Technologies
8/96 D. Mass. Securities Securities Milberg
Weiss
In re Domestic Air
Transportation Antitrust
Litigation
ND N.D. Ga. Antitrust Coupon
Duncan v. Pencer 2/97 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss
Ehrenreich v. Sensor-
matic Electronics Corp.
3/97 S.D. Fla. Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss
In re The Exxon Valdez 8/93 D. Alaska.
& Alaska
Super. Ct.
Tort Cash
Feinberg v. Dean Witter
Reynolds
4/94 N.Y. Su-
per. Ct.
Consumer Coupon
Feinberg v. Hibernia
Corp.
12/95 E.D. La. Securities Cash Weiss &
Yourman
Finch v. First Fidelity
Bank
10/93 N.J. Super.
Ct.
Consumer Unknown
First Eastern Corp.
v. Mainwaring
ND E.D. Pa. Securities Cash
In re GE Energy Choice
Lightbulb Consumer
Litigation
ND N.D. Cal. Consumer Coupon Milberg
Weiss
Goshen v. Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of New
York
12/96 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Consumer Unknown Milberg
Weiss
Gredell v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc.
11/94 Ill. Cir. Ct. Consumer Fluid
Gruby v. Brady 10/95 S.D.N.Y. Employment Unknown
In re Gupta Corp.
Securities Litigation
9/95 N.D. Cal. Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss
Guttman v. Clabir Corp. 6/93 D. Conn. Securities Cash
Hansen v. Suffolk County
NY
11/94 E.D.N.Y. Other Unknown
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Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
In re Health
Management Inc.
Securities Litigation
10/96 E.D.N.Y. Securities Cash
In re Helionetics, Inc.
Securities Litigation
2/96 C.D. Cal. Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss,
Abbey
Herrmann v. Meridian
Mortgage Corp.
4/97 Pa. C.P. Consumer Unknown Zimmer-
man Reed
Hirshon v. Republic of
Bolovia
1/97 D.D.C. Securities Cash
In re ICN/Viratek
Securities Litigation
4/96 S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown Bernstein
Litowitz
IDS Life Insurance Co. v.
Darling-Delaware Co.,
Inc.
10/93 N.D. Ill. Securities Securities
In re In-Store Advertis-
ing Securities Litigation
10/96 S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss
In re Insurance Antitrust
Litigation
1/95 N.D. Cal. Antitrust Fluid Berger &
Montague
In re Integrated
Resources Securities
Litigation
4/95 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash
Intel 486 Processor
Litigation
11/96 Pa. C.P. Consumer Coupon
Israel v. Citibank, N.A. 2/93 Mo. Cir.
Ct.
Consumer Unknown
Jacobson v. Midland
Mortgage Co.
2/94 D. Minn. Consumer Unknown Zimmer-
man Reed
J/H Real Estate, Inc. v.
Abramson
11/96 E.D. Pa. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss,
Berger &
Montague
Johnston v. Comerica
Mortgage Corp.
8/94 D. Minn. Consumer Cash Zimmer-
man Reed
In re Joint Eastern and
Southern District Asbes-
tos Litigation
8/94 E.D.N.Y.
&
S.D.N.Y.
Tort Unknown
Kaplan v. EF Hutton
Group, Inc.
12/93 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Securities Cash
Kruse v. Barclays Ameri-
can Mortgage Corp.
6/94 D. Minn. Consumer Cash Zimmer-
man Reed
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Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
Lard v. Leucadia
National Corp.
5/95 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss
Leo v. General Electric
Co.
8/93 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Other Unknown
Lerner v. Statewide
Bancorp
ND D.N.J. Securities Cash
LTV Steel Co. 2/95 Not Listed Securities Cash
Mark v. Key Corp.
Mortgage, Inc.
6/97 N.D. Ill. Consumer Cash Zimmer-
man Reed
Marton and Marton v.
Metmor Financial, Inc.
4/97 Nev. Dist.
Ct.
Securities Unknown
In re Melridge, Inc.
Securities Litigation
9/93 D. Or. Securities Cash Berger &
Montague
Meserow v. Sears
Mortgage Corp.
7/94 D. Minn. Consumer Cash Zimmer-
man Reed
In re Michael Milkin and
Associates Securities
Litigation
ND S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown Berger &
Montague
Michels v. Phoenix Home
Life Mutual Insurance
Co.
9/96 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Consumer Coupon
Morton v. BancPLUS
Mortgage Corp.
11/95 N.D. Ill. Consumer Unknown Zimmer-
man Reed
Mufford v. Dale
Mortgage Bankers Corp.
2/96 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Consumer Unknown Zimmer-
man Reed
Natal v. Transamerica
Occidental Life
Insurance Co.
4/97 Cal. Su-
per. Ct.
Consumer Coupon
In re Net Worth Inc.
Securities Litigation
10/94 N.D. Tex Securities Cash Bernstein
Litowitz,
Milberg
Weiss
In re Norand Corp.
Securities Litigation
11/96 N.D. Iowa Securities Securities Bernstein
Litowitz,
Milberg
Weiss
In re Oracle Securities
Litigation
ND N.D. Cal. Securities Cash
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Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
In re Packard Bell
Consumer Class Action
Litigation
7/95 Cal. Su-
per. Ct.
Consumer Monitoring Milberg
Weiss,
Bernstein
Litowitz
In re Paine Webber
Limited Partnerships
Litigation
8/96 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss
In re Pentium Processor
Litigation
4/95 Cal. Su-
per. Ct.
Consumer Monitoring Milberg
Weiss,
Bernstein
Litowitz,
Weiss &
Yourman
Prince George Center,
Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.
3/95 Pa. C.P. Tort Cash
In re The Prudential Ins.
Company of America
Sales Practices Litigation
10/96 D.N.J. Consumer Coupon
In re Prudential
Securities Inc. Limited
Partnerships Litigation
9/95 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss
Pruitt v. Rockefeller
Center Properties, Inc.
3/93 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Securities Securities
Pryor v. USX Corp. 3/93 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash
Reebok International,
Inc. Antitrust Litigation
7/95 S.D.N.Y. Antitrust Fluid
Roberts v. U.S.
Homecare Corp.
11/94 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash
In re Sahlen and
Associates, Inc. Securities
Litigation
5/94 S.D. Fla. Securities Unknown
Scheatzle v. Eubanks 5/94 N.D. Cal. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss
Rose v. Cooney 7/94 D. Conn. Employment Cash Berger &
Montague
Rosenbaum v.
MacAlister
10/93 D. Colo. Securities Unknown
Schneider v. GE Capital
Mortgage Services, Inc.
2/97 S.D.N.Y. Consumer Cash
Schwab v. America
On-Line, Inc.
5/96 Ill. Cir. Ct. Consumer Coupon Milberg
Weiss
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Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
Searcy v. Victoria
Mortgage Corp.
1/96 N.D. Ill. Consumer Unknown Zimmer-
man Reed
Shea v. New York Life
Insurance Co.
5/96 S.D. Fla. Securities Unknown
Siegel v. Syncronys 3/96 Ill. Cir. Ct. Consumer Coupon
Silverman v. CPS
Chemical Co.
1/94 D.N.J. Securities Unknown
In re SLM International,
Inc. Securities Litigation
ND S.D.N.Y. Securities Securities Milberg
Weiss,
Abbey
Smith v. Torchmark
Corp.
3/96 W.D. Mo. Antitrust Unknown
In re Snapple Beverage
Corp. Securities
Litigation
1/97 E.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Abbey
Soicher v. Long Island
Savings Bank
5/95 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Consumer Unknown Milberg
Weiss
In re Soybean Futures
Litigation
10/96 N.D. Ill. Securities Unknown
Spillane v. G.T. Greater
Europe Fund
9/96 N.D. Cal. Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss,
Weiss &
Yourman
Spitz v. Connecticut
General Life Insurance
Co.
10/96 C.D. Cal. Consumer Unknown
Stark v. Dievler ND N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Securities Unknown Abbey
In re Storage Technology
Securities Litigation
3/95 D. Colo. Securities Unknown Berger &
Montague,
Bernstein
Litowitz
In re Sun Healthcare
Group, Inc. Litigation
2/97 D.N.M. Securities Cash Abbey
In re Taxable Municipal
Bond Securities
Litigation
2/95 E.D. La. Securities Cash
In re Tiphook Securities
Litigation
4/95 D.N.J. Securities Cash Berger &
Montague
Trief v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp.
7/93 S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown
MILLER.FMT 09/16/98  4:11 PM
142 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 4
Case name Date Court Case Type Settlement Attorneys
Urbach v. Sayles 2/95 D.N.J. Securities Cash
Wills v. Cenlar Federal
Savings Bank
8/94 D. Minn. Consumer Cash Zimmer-
man Reed
Willson v. New York Life
Insurance Co.
10/96 N.Y. Sup.
Ct.
Consumer Coupon Milberg
Weiss
Wingate v. Bank of
America
3/95 C.D. Cal. Consumer Cash Zimmer-
man Reed
Woodward v. Nor-Am
Chemical Co.
9/95 S.D. Ala. Tort Monitoring
Zicklin v. Phillips-Van
Heusen Corp.
4/97 S.D.N.Y. Securities Cash Milberg
Weiss
Zucker v. Sasaki 5/97 S.D.N.Y. Securities Unknown Milberg
Weiss,
Weiss &
Yourman
In re ZZZZ Best Securi-
ties Litigation
10/95 C.D. Cal. Securities Unknown
Notes: The “Abbey” firm refers to the firm formerly known as Abbey & Ellis and now Abbey
Gardy & Squitieri; the Weiss & Yourman firm was formerly Joseph Weiss, Esq.  “ND” means “no date.”
B.  Attorneys’ Fees in Common Fund Cases
In this section, we examine the rules on common fund and common benefit
fee awards in the federal circuits and in each of the fifty states.77 A detailed
analysis of the results of this survey is contained in Table 9 (federal courts of
appeals) and Table 10 (state courts).  We briefly summarize the results here.
We divide fee rules into five general categories: lodestar, percentage, per-
centage or lodestar, multifactor, and unsettled.  There is some degree of judg-
ment required for this categorization, since the decisions are not always per-
fectly clear and since they sometimes endorse one approach while approving
fees apparently set through some other method.  Moreover, there may be varia-
tion in the actual operation of particular methodologies in setting fees that have
significant impacts on actual fees.  For example, two states may use the lodestar
                                                          
77. For background on attorneys’ fees in class actions, see Bruce Hay, The Theory of Fee Regula-
tion in Class Action Settlements, 46 AMER. U. L. REV. 1429 (1997); Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorneys
Fees in Common Fund Actions, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Charles Silver, Incoherence & Irra-
tionality in the Law of  Attorneys’ Fees, 12 REV. LITIG. 301 (1993); Charles Silver, A Restitutionary
Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (1991); Charles Silver, Unloading
the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1992).
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approach, but one may allow contingency enhancements and the other not; the
end result will be significant variation in the fees awarded.
In the federal courts, the cases reveal a distinct trend away from the lode-
star approach and toward the percentage approach.  Three federal circuits now
appear to mandate the use of the percentage approach, and only twothe Sec-
ond and Fifth Circuitsuse the lodestar without permitting the percentage ap-
proach at least as an alternative mechanism.  The other circuits (other than the
Federal Circuit, which has no rule) give trial courts wide discretion in setting
fees, but permit (and sometimes encourage) the use of the percentage ap-
proach.  The federal circuits break down as follows:
TABLE A6
FEDERAL CIRCUIT BREAKDOWN
Lodestar    2
Percentage    3
Either    6
Factor Analysis    1
Unsettled    1
In the states, we see a significantly different picture.78  Some states have
joined the federal trend toward the percentage method; for example, Alabama
adopted the percentage of the recovery method in 1995, and Illinois permitted
but did not require the percentage approach the same year.  However, other
states have gone in the opposite direction.  Florida rejected the percentage ap-
proach in 1995, and California appeared to require the lodestar approach and
to disapprove percentage fees in 1991.  Indeed, there are a few states in which
common benefit recoveries are not recognized, and at least
oneVermontthat has yet to accept even the common fund rule on class ac-
tion fees.  A summary breakdown of state fee rules is shown in the following
table:
                                                          
78. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous state-by-state survey of fee award methods
in class action cases.
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TABLE A7
STATE BREAKDOWN
Lodestar    7
Percentage    3
Either    8
Factor Analysis   15
Unsettled   17
To what extent do we observe nonpecuniary settlements being brought into
courts that have discretion to award fees on a percentage method?  Our data do
not support the proposition that the applicable rule on attorneys’ fees influ-
ences the choice between nonpecuniary and cash settlements.  However, the
small sample size makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions.  Moreover, be-
cause the newspaper we use for our data (the New York Times) is based in New
York, the cases reflect a fairly high percentage of New York litigation, and nei-
ther the state nor the federal courts in New York permit percentage of the re-
covery fees.  Of our sample of settlements in the New York Times data set, we
find the following:
TABLE A8
ATTORNEYS FEES RULES IN NONPECUNIARY CASES
Type of Settlement Total
Percentage
Required
Percentage
Permitted
Percentage Not
Permitted
Coupon 13 3 4 6
Securities 9 1 5 3
Fluid Recovery 3 0 2 1
Monitoring 3 1 0 2
More complete information on applicable attorneys’ fee rules in federal and
state courts is provided in the following tables.
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TABLE A9
COMMON FUND OR COMMON BENEFIT AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
IN CLASS ACTIONS:  FEDERAL RULES
Circuit Method Notes
First Lodestar or Percentage79 Court expresses preference for percent-
age method80
Second Lodestar81
Third Percentage82 Lodestar can be used as check on per-
centage award83
Fourth Multi-factor84
Fifth Lodestar85
Sixth Lodestar or Percentage86
Seventh Lodestar or Percentage87 Court expresses preference for percent-
age method88
Eighth Lodestar or Percentage89
Ninth Lodestar or Percentage90 “Benchmark” of 25 percent of common
fund recognized.91
Tenth Lodestar or Percentage92 Court expresses preference for percent-
age method;93 but percentage is not used
common benefit cases.94
Eleventh95 Percentage
                                                          
79. See In re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d
295, 306-08 (1st Cir. 1995).
80. See Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 526 n.10 (1st Cir. 1991).
81. See In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
926 (1987).
82. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995).
83. See, e.g., Strang v. JHM Mortgage Sec. Ltd. Partnership, 890 F. Supp. 499, 502-03 (E.D. Va.
1995).
84. See Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1979) (not a class action).
85. See Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 98 F.3d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1974).
86. See Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993).
87. See Florin v. Nationsbank of Ga., 34 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 1994).
88. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1992).
89. See Johnston v. Cenlar Fed. Sav. Bank, 83 F.3d 241 (8th Cir. 1996).
90. See In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994).
91. See Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
92. See Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822
(1988).
93. See Rosenbaum v. MacCallister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1445 (10th Cir. 1995).
94. See id.
95. See Camden I Condo. Ass’n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991).
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Circuit Method Notes
District of
Columbia
Percentage96
Federal Unsettled
TABLE A10
COMMON FUND OR COMMON BENEFIT AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
IN CLASS ACTIONS:  STATE RULES
State Method Notes
Alabama Percentage97 Percentage adopted for common fund class
actions in 1995;98 multi-factor test used
earlier 99
Alaska Lodestar or
Percentage100
Modified English Rule under which losing
party pays winner’s fees in certain cases.101
Courts assessing fees first determine
“compensable value” of  attorney’s services
to class and then apply fee-shifting rule.102
However,  difficulty in calculating value of
common benefit may make percentage
approach inappropriate.103
                                                          
96. See Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
97. See Edelman & Combs v. Law, 663 So. 2d 957 (Ala. 1995).
98. See id.
99. See State v. Brown, 577 So. 2d 1256 (Ala. 1991).  The factors are the following:
(1) [t]he measure of success achieved, (2) [t]he nature and value of the subject matter of the
attorney’s employment, including the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3)
[t]he learning, skill, and labor requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) [t]he time
consumed and reasonable expenses incurred by the attorney; (5) [t]he professional experi-
ence, reputation and ability of the attorney; (6) [t]he weight of his responsibility; (7) [t]he fee
arrangement between attorney and client, including whether a fee was fixed or contingent;
(8) [t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services and awards in similar
cases; (9) [t]he time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (10) [t]he like-
lihood that the attorney’s employment in this case precluded other employment; (11) [t]he
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (12) [t]he undesirability of
the case; (13) [a]ny non-monetary benefits conferred upon the class.
Id. at 1258.
100. See Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 920 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1996).  Fees may also be awarded to
counsel for the prevailing class against the defendant under Alaska’s English Rule on fee-shifting.  See
Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997); Municipality of Anchorage v. Gen-
tile, 922 P.2d 248, 266 (Alaska 1996).  As described more fully below, either lodestar or percentage
may be used in calculating the fee-shifting award, although, depending on how the rule is applied, class
counsel may not receive full recovery when fees are awarded against the defendant.
101. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a).
102. Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile, 922 P.2d 248, 263 (Alaska 1996) (Trial courts in class
action cases should “(1) determine the compensable value of the services the attorneys rendered to the
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State Method Notes
Arizona Lodestar104 or
Percentage105
Percentage fee may be limited to private
attorney general actions
Arkansas Multi-factor106 Percentage may be one factor to be
considered107
California Lodestar108 Percentage method of “questionable
validity.”109  If permissible at all,  percentage
applies only when litigation generates
“certain or easily calculable sum of
money.”110  No recovery under percentage
method for coupon settlements.111
Contingency risk enhancement permitted in
lodestar cases.112
Colorado Multi-factor113 Common fund doctrine.114  Attorneys’ fees in
class actions against public entities limited
by statute.115
                                                          
class, and (2) apply Rule 82 to the amount calculated in Step 1 to decide how much [the non-prevailing
party] should pay.”).  In determining the compensable value of class counsel’s services, the court may
consider such factors as “the need to promote the efficient use of court resources” through the use of
class action litigation, and “the potential difficulty of attracting capable counsel.”  Id. at 264.  The ab-
sence of a traditional fund does not preclude application of the common fund rationale in an appropri-
ate case, when evaluating the attorney’s services during Step 1.  Id. at 266.  Because Alaska’s Rule 82
is designed to provide only partial, not full compensation to prevailing parties, strict application of the
rule would result in class action attorneys receiving less than market value compensation.  However,
the Alaska Supreme Court has suggested that the trial court may, in its discretion, adjust the award
upward to a fully compensatory fee if the standards of Rule 82(b)(3) warrant doing so.  See Municipal-
ity of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997).
103. See id.
104. See London v. Green Acres Trust, 765 P.2d 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
105. The Arizona Supreme Court awarded a percentage fee in a “private attorney general” action
designed to vindicate important public policies.  See Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 775 P.2d
521 (Ariz. 1989).
106. See Powell v. Henry, 592 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Ark. 1980) (time spent on case is only one factor to
be considered; other factors include the ability of counsel, the nature and extent of the services ren-
dered, the result obtained, the percentage of the recovery, and uncertainty of ultimate recovery).
107. See id. at 111 (approving an award of 15% of the recovery under a factor analysis, but declin-
ing to set specific percentage standards).
108. See, e.g., Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank, 284 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Serrano v.
Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977).
109. See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see also People ex
rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Yuki, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303
(Cal. 1977) (acknowledging possibility of percentage method in California, but not deciding the issue).
110. Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1307.
111. See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
112. See Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
113. See City of Wheat Ridge v. Cerveny, 913 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1996) (not a class action) (adopting
standards of DR 2-106); Mau v. E.P.H. Corp., 638 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1981).  In Kuhn v. State, 924 P.2d
1053 (Colo. 1996), the trial court approved an attorneys’ fee based on 25% of a common fund, but the
Supreme Court of Colorado did not address the issue whether the percentage method is a generally
accepted means for determining fees in common fund cases.
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State Method Notes
Connecticut Multi-factor116
Delaware Multi-factor117 Common fund doctrine.118  Recent Supreme
Court decision affirmed award of one-third
of amounts actually paid in a reverter
settlement but denying recovery for
unclaimed amounts. 119
Florida Lodestar120 Common fund doctrine121
Georgia Unsettled Common fund and common benefit
recovery122
Hawaii Lodestar123 Common fund recoveries 124
Idaho Unsettled
Illinois Lodestar or
Percentage125
1995 decision revised previous rule requiring
use of lodestar126
Indiana Lodestar or
Percentage127
1996 decision declined to follow federal
trend mandating percentage method
Iowa Multi-factor128 Factor analysis may result in approval of
percentage fee agreed to by parties129
                                                          
114. See Trevino v. HHL Fin. Servs., Inc., 945 P.2d 1345 (Colo. 1997); Kuhn v. State, 924 P.2d 1053,
1057 (Colo. 1996).
115. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-203 (“If the plaintiffs prevail in any  class action  litigation
brought against any public entity  . . .  the amount of  attorney fees  which the plaintiffs’ attorney is en-
titled to receive out of any award to the plaintiffs shall . . .  not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dol-
lars . . ..”).
116. See Hernandez v. Monterey Village Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 589 A.2d 888 n.3 (Conn. Ct. App.
1991) (endorsing the factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19
(5th Cir. 1974)).  As stated by the Superior Court, those factors are the following: (1) the time and la-
bor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3) the skill required to perform
the legal services; (4) the preclusion of other  employment by the attorneys due to acceptance of the
case; (5) the customary fee in the community; (6)  whether the  fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9)
the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of  the case; (11)  the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.  See,
e.g., Ham v. Greene, No. CV 91032275S, 1997 WL 255274, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
117. See Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, 681 A.2d 1039 (Del. 1996).
118. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 517 A.2d 653, 654-55 (Del. Ch. 1986).
119. See Goodrich, 681 A.2d at 1039; Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., No. 360 (1995), 1996
Del. LEXIS 73 (report of Chancellor Allen).
120. See Kuhnlein v. Department of Revenue, 662 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1995) (fee agreement between
named plaintiffs and their attorneys in a common-fund class action cannot bind the remaining class
members, so that court must use lodestar method to determine fees).
121. See Costello v. City of Cape Coral, 693 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (not a class case).
122. See Industrial Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Waite, 485 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ga. 1997); State v. Private
Truck Council of Am., Inc., 371 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. 1988).
123. See Montalvo v. Chang, 641 P.2d 1321 (Haw. 1982).
124. See id.
125. See Brundidge v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 659 N.E.2d 909 (Ill. 1995).
126. See id.
127. See Citizens Action Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. PSI Energy, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (dicta).
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State Method Notes
Kansas Lodestar130 Common fund;131  lodestar modified by other
factors132 and checked against percent of
recovery133
Kentucky Unsettled Recognizes common fund by statute134
Louisiana Multi-factor135 Recovery on quantum meruit basis, taking a
variety of factors into account136
Maine Unsettled Appears to reject common fund137
Maryland Multi-factor138
Massachusetts Multi-factor139 Common fund140
Michigan Lodestar141 Common fund only; no common benefit142
                                                          
128. See IOWA R. CIV. P. 42.16(e).  This rule provides that “[i]n determining the amount of attor-
ney’s fees for a prevailing class the court shall consider the following factors: (1) [t]he time and effort
expended by the attorney in the litigation, including the nature, extent, and quality of the services ren-
dered; (2) [r]esults achieved and benefits conferred upon the class; (3) [t]he magnitude, complexity,
and uniqueness of the litigation; (4) [t]he contingent nature of success; (5)[i]n cases awarding attor-
ney’s fees and litigation expenses [for litigation involving the] vindication of an important public inter-
est, the economic impact on the party against whom the award is made; and (6) [a]ppropriate criteria
in the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers.”  Id.
129. See King v. Armstrong, 518 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1994) (approving a fee award of 50% of the re-
covery under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 42.16(e) when class counsel had bargained at arms length
for a contingency agreement with qualified class representative and case had low prospects of success).
130. See Gigot v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 737 P.2d 18 (Kan. 1987); Alison v. Board of County Comm’rs,
737 P.2d 6 (Kan. 1987).
131. See id.
132. The factors are those found in Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1164 (Kan.
1984), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 472 U.S. 797 (1985): (1) the number of hours spent on the case by
the various attorneys and the manner in which they were spent; (2) the reasonable hourly rate for each
attorney; (3) the contingent nature of success; (4) the extent, if any, to which the quality of an attor-
ney’s work mandates increasing or decreasing [the] amount to which the court has found the attorney
reasonably entitled; (5) the amount involved in the  class action; and (6) the benefit produced by the
lawsuit.
133. See Gigot, 737 P.2d at 28 (noting that “in the normal range of common fund recoveries, com-
mon fee awards fall in the 20 to 30 percent range”).
134. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412.070 provides for an allowance of fees and costs from a recovered
fund “if one or more of . . . the parties in interest has prosecuted for the benefit of others interested
with him and has been to trouble and expense in that connection.”  See Commonwealth of Ky. Reve-
nue Cabinet v. Herschel St. Ledger, 955 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
135. See White v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of La., 276 So.2d 714 (La. Ct.
App. 1973); In re Interstate Trust and Banking Co., 106 So. 2d 276 (La. 1958).  The factors include
“the extent and nature of the services rendered . . . ; the labor, time, and trouble involved; the results
achieved; the character and importance of the matter; the amount of money involved; the learning,
skill, and experience exercised; and the difficulty of the legal problems.”  Id. at 282.
136. See id.
137. See Poussard, et al. v. Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. 479 A.2d 881, 883 (Me. 1984); Thiboutot v.
State, 405 A.2d 230, 238 (Me. 1979), aff’d, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
138. See, e.g., Hohensee v. Minear, 270 A.2d 776 (Md. 1970).
139. See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 550 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1990)
(affirming trial court’s discretionary award of fees out of common fund).
140. See Pearson v. Board of Health, 525 N.E.2d 400, 402 n.3 (Mass. 1988).
141. See Grigg v. Michigan Nat’l Bank, 274 N.W.2d 752, 770 (Mich. 1979) (“Reasonableness of the
fees would depend primarily upon the amount of time the attorneys spent on the case and upon the
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State Method Notes
Minnesota Lodestar or
Percentage143
In case with both monetary and non-
monetary relief, appeals court instructed
trial court to consider fees based on entire
value of settlement rather than only on value
of cash portion144
Mississippi Unsettled Recognizes common fund by statute;145 not
for private attorney general suits146
Missouri Multi-Factor147 Trial court has discretion to award fees
based on percent of recovery148
Montana Unsettled Common fund149
Nebraska Unsettled Common fund,  but not common benefit
recovery150
Nevada Unsettled Court recognizes both common fund and
common benefit rules in dicta151
New Hamp-
shire
Unsettled Common benefit recovery152
New Jersey Multi-factor153 Early case recognizes common fund
doctrine;154 court recognizes contingency
enhancement for lodestar awards under
fee-shifting statutes155
                                                          
nature and extent of the benefit conferred upon the intervening class members.  Such a fee, plus costs,
would be payable from the proceeds of the judgment prior to computation for distribution.”).
142. See Dozier v. Automobile Club of Mich., 244 N.W.2d 376 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
143. See Heller v. Schwan’s Sales Enter., Inc., 548 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
award of one-sixth of the recovery was appropriate in a common fund case).
144. See Hawkins v. Thorp Loan and Thrift Company, No. C3-91-1705, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS
1257.
145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-53-37 (1997) provides that “[w]here a party hereafter institutes a suit
for the benefit of himself and all others similarly situated, and thereby there is in such suit recovered
or preserved property or a fund for the common benefit, the chancery court may make an allowance to
such party of the reasonable costs incurred, which costs shall include the necessary disbursements, and
reasonable solicitor’s fees, out of the property recovered or preserved for the common benefit.”
146. See Fordice v. Thomas, 649 So. 2d 835 (Miss. 1995).
147. See Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc., 360 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1962).  In determining the reasonable
value of legal services, the trial court is instructed to consider the time spent, nature and character of
services rendered, nature and importance of the subject matter, degree of responsibility imposed on
the attorney, value of property or money involved, degree of professional ability required and the re-
sult.  See In Re Alcolac, Inc. Litig., 945 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Union Center Re-
dev. Corp. v. Leslie, 733 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
148. See In re Alcolac, 945 S.W.2d at 461; Senn v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119,
138 (Mo. 1979) (assuming that class counsel in common fund case would be paid on a percentage ba-
sis).
149. See Murer v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund, 942 P.2d 69 (Mont. 1997); Means v. Mon-
tana Power Co., 625 P.2d 32 (Mont. 1981).
150. See Dennis v. State, 451 N.W.2d 676 (Neb. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 439 (1991).
151. See Guild, Hagen & Clark, Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 600 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1979).
152. See Mooney v. City of Laconia, 573 A.2d 447 (N.H. 1990).
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State Method Notes
New Mexico Unsettled
New York Lodestar156 Statute permits courts in class action cases to
award fees based on reasonable value of
legal services rendered157
North Carolina Unsettled Common fund158
North Dakota Percentage159 Lodestar not mentioned.
Ohio Lodestar or
Percentage160
Oklahoma Unsettled Court recognizes both common fund and
common benefit rules in dicta.161
Oregon Multi-factor162 Civil Procedure rule allows courts to award
attorneys fees but does not establish
procedure for doing so163
Pennsylvania Multi-factor164 Recognizes common fund by statute;165  court
declines to award fees on private attorney
general theory166
                                                          
153. N.J. RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reason-
able.  The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1)
the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite
to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5)
the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the pro-
fessional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or law-
yers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”  But cf. Incollingo v. Canuso,
687 A.2d 778 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (disapproving use of factor analysis in statutory fee-
shifting cases).
154. See Sarner v. Sarner, 185 A.2d 851 (N.J. 1962).
155. See Rendine v. Lorestani, 661 A.2d 1202, 1231 (N.J. 1995).
156. See, e.g., Becker v. Empire of America Fed. Sav. Bank, 577 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (holding that court must first consider the number of hours reasonably expended from contem-
poraneous time sheets); Estuch v. Volkswagen AG, 578 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Matter of
Rahmey v. Blum, 466 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356-57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
157. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES § 909: “[i]f a judgment in an action maintained as a
class action is rendered in favor of the class, the court in its discretion may award attorneys’ fees to the
representatives of the class based on the reasonable value of legal services rendered and if justice re-
quires, allow recovery of the amount awarded from the opponent of the class.”
158. See Faulkenbury v. Teachers’ & State Employees Retirement Sys. of North Carolina, 483
S.E.2d 422 (N.C. 1997).
159. See Horst v. Guy, 211 N.W.2d 723 (N.D. 1973) (approving as proper an award of 25% of the
recovery).
160. See Steiner v. Van Dorn Co., 660 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (shareholders derivative
case).
161. See City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977).
162. See Kalman v. Robert Curry, Water Front Recreation, Inc., 745 P.2d 1232 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
163. See OR. R. CIV. P. 32N (in setting a fee in a class action, court is to consider the following fac-
tors: the time and effort expended by the attorney in the litigation, including the nature, extent, and
quality of the services rendered; the results achieved and benefits conferred upon the class; the magni-
tude, complexity, and uniqueness of the litigation; the contingent nature of success; and appropriate
criteria in the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility).
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State Method Notes
Rhode Island Unsettled Common fund doctrine.167
South Carolina Unsettled
South Dakota Unsettled Common fund, but common benefit rejected
at least in suits against state168
Tennessee Multi-factor169 Courts expressly reject lodestar
Texas Lodestar or
Percentage170
Trial courts are instructed to test percentage
fee against lodestar in non-monetary
settlement cases in order “to prevent grossly
excessive attorney’s fee awards and to
minimize the inherent conflict between class
counsel and the class members”171
Utah Multi-factor172 Recent decision suggested that stipulation of
settlement using percentage of recover may
be permissible173
Vermont Unsettled Has not yet accepted common fund
recoveries and declined opportunity to do so
in 1993174
Virginia Unsettled
                                                          
164. See Jones v. Muir, 515 A.2d 855 (Pa. 1986); PA. R. CIV. P. 1716 (“In all cases where the court
is authorized under applicable law to fix the amount of counsel fees it shall consider, among other
things, the following factors: (1) the time and effort reasonably expended by the attorney in the litiga-
tion; (2) the quality of the services rendered; (3) the results achieved and benefits conferred upon the
class or upon the public; (4) the magnitude, complexity and uniqueness of the litigation; and (5)
whether the receipt of a fee was contingent on success.  Note: The rule does not determine when fees
may be awarded.  That is a matter of substantive law.  The order in which the factors are listed is not
intended to indicate the priority or weight to be accorded them respectively.”).
165. See 42 PA. CODE § 2503(8) (1997) (“The following participants shall be entitled to a reason-
able counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter: . . . [a]ny participant who is awarded counsel
fees out of a fund within the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to any general rule relating to an award
of counsel fees from a fund within the jurisdiction of the court.”).
166. See Jones v. Muir, 515 A.2d 855 (Pa. 1986).
167. See Malinou v. Powers, 333 A.2d 420 (R.I. 1975).
168. See Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota Util. Co., 332 N.W.2d 279 (S.D.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
915 (1983).
169. See United Med. Corp. v. Hohenwald Bank, 703 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Tenn. 1986) (not a class
case) (applying standards of DR 2-106); Hobson v. First State Bank, 801 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1990) (recognizing common fund doctrine).
170. See General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996).
171. See id. at 961.
172. The leading case is Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990), in which the Supreme
Court of Utah upheld a trial court’s use of the lodestar approach in a common fund case as not an
abuse of discretion, but observed that the trial court had weighed the lodestar results along with other
factors, including a review of Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the settlement agreement,
state legislation, the report of a special master, and the percentage of the total common fund to be
used for class counsel fees.
173. The Utah Supreme Court approved a stipulation of settlement awarding approximately 20%
of the recovery, a result suggesting that percentage settlements may be acceptable in appropriate
cases.  See id.
174. See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 636 A.2d 342 (Vt. 1993).
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State Method Notes
Washington Percentage175 Court notes percentages are “often in the
range of 20 to 30 percent”, and that under
“special circumstances,”  percentage can be
replaced by lodestar176
West Virginia Multi-factor177
Wisconsin Lodestar or
Percentage178
Common fund in 1997179
Wyoming Lodestar180 Adopts multifactor test of DR 2-106 by
statute,181 but Supreme Court endorses
lodestar, viewing it as equivalent182
                                                          
175. See Bowles v. Washington Dep’t of Retirement Sys., 847 P.2d 440 (Wash. 1993).
176. Id. at 450, 451.
177. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156, 162 (W. Va. 1986) (not a class case)
(reasonableness of the fee sought against a third party is generally to be determined based on factors
such as (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill req-
uisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
time imitations  imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.)
178. See Wisconsin Retired Teachers Ass’n v. Employe [sic] Trust Funds Board, 558 N.W.2d 83
(Wis. 1997).  In addition, the court is required to consider: “the time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the question presented by the case, the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly, the preclusion of other employment by the attorneys due to acceptance of the case, the cus-
tomary fee, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, any time limitation imposed by the client or the cir-
cumstances, the amount involved and the results obtained, the experience, reputation and ability [of]
the attorney, the undesirability of the case, the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client, and awards in similar cases.”  Id. at 99.
179. See id.
180. See McLain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468 (Wyo. 1997) (not a class case).
181. See Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 863 (Wyo. 1997) (not a class case) (citing WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-14-126(b)).
182. See Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1995).
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